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Get Out From Under My Land! Hydraulic 
Fracturing, Forced Pooling or Unitization, and the 
Role of the Dissenting Landowner  
HEIDI GOROVITZ ROBERTSON J.D., J.S.D.*                                                                                         
ABSTRACT 
This article  addresses  the legal  circumstances  arising  when  a  state  agency 
authorizes oil  and  gas  production  operations  beneath  a landowner’s land 
against that landowner’s wishes. One might assume that, if a landowner wants 
to preserve his or her land from oil and gas development, the landowner could 
simply refuse to allow drilling to occur beneath the land. However, neighbors 
may want to develop the oil and gas resources beneath their own land. To sat-
isfy the neighbors’ wishes, an oil and gas producer must assemble mineral pro-
duction  rights  on  or  beneath  enough  contiguous land  to  satisfy  state  spacing  
and  acreage  requirements  and  industry  best  practices.  This  may  require  the 
producer to include the landowner’s land in the contiguous parcel. In fact, the 
producer often cannot assemble an appropriately sized or shaped drilling unit 
to  satisfy  the  state  spacing  and  acreage  requirements  without including  that 
landowner’s land in the contiguous parcel. 
The  producer  may offer  the landowner  payment  in exchange  for  permis-
sion to add his or her land to the drilling unit. However, the landowner may still 
prefer that the land and its subterranean oil and gas resources remain undis-
turbed;  the landowner  may value  no drilling  more  than  he  or  she values  the 
monetary  incentive  offered  to  him  or  her.  Therein lies  the dilemma.  Without 
including the landowner’s land in the contiguous parcel, neighbors cannot de-
velop the oil and gas resources beneath their own land. By dissenting, a single 
landowner could veto his or her neighbors’ efforts to develop underground oil 
and gas. And yet, including the “dissenting landowner’s” land in a drilling unit 
against his or her will seems to violate traditional common law notions of prop- 
erty ownership. 
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Is one landowner really able to veto his or her neighbors’ prospects of devel-
oping oil and gas resources by refusing to add his or her own land to a pro-
ducer’s drilling  unit? Although landowners generally control  rights of  access 
and rights of use on their land, legislation in many states allows a state agency 
to add land to a drilling unit without the owner’s permission. These laws protect 
neighbors’ development rights—called correlative rights—to develop resources, 
promoting the broader development of oil and gas resources. Therefore, the state 
agency can add land to a producer’s drilling unit without the landowner’s per-
mission  so  that oil  and  gas  producers  can assemble legally  sized  and  efficient 
drilling units, and neighbors can develop the oil and gas beneath their land. 
This article explores the legal circumstances of the “dissenting landowner”— 
a land (or mineral rights) owner who wants to bar oil and gas development 
from occurring beneath his or her land but whose land is forced into a dril-
ling  unit  by  a  state  agency  as  authorized  by  state  mandatory pooling  or 
forced unitization laws. It briefly explains the history and nature of the man-
datory pooling and forced unitization laws that force dissenting landowners 
into drilling  units  against  their will.  It  describes  the  tensions  between  the 
dissenting landowners’  property  rights  and  the  neighboring landowners’ 
correlative rights. It considers and describes the ways states use these laws 
to  reduce  the  dissenting landowners’  property  rights,  instead  favoring  the 
correlative  rights of their neighbors. It illustrates  these issues by focusing 
on Ohio’s application of mandatory pooling and forced unitization. Finally, 
it  considers  the  various  statutory, regulatory, constitutional,  and  common 
law methods a dissenting landowner may employ to avoid drilling unit pro-
duction  (and  thus allow  the  resource  to  remain  underground)  during  the 
mandatory pooling or unitization process and following the forced pooling  
or mandatory unitization as a means of redress.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses the legal rights and remedies of a landowner when 
the state allows oil and gas drilling to proceed beneath a landowner’s land  
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against his or her wishes. If one owns land and wants to preserve it, free from 
oil and gas drilling, one might assume he or she could simply refuse to allow 
drilling  to  occur  there—after all,  the  person  who  owns  the land should  be 
able  to  decide  what’s  done  beneath  it. Surprisingly,  this  is  not  the  case  in  
most states. 
Many states have mandatory pooling or forced unitization laws which allow 
a state agency to add land to a drilling unit 1 against the landowner’s wishes. 2 
Pursuant  to  these  statutes,  to  satisfy  state well-spacing  and  acreage  require-
ments and industry best practices, a driller must assemble the right to drill on 
or beneath a prescribed amount of contiguous land. The driller may need to 
include another person’s land in the assembled parcel to satisfy those require-
ments. The purposes of mandatory pooling and forced unitization statutes are 
to  protect  the  neighbors’ rights—called correlative  rights 3—to develop  the 
resource, and to promote the broader development of oil and gas resources. 4 
Without including  the  dissenter’s land,  it  may  be difficult  for  the driller  to 
assemble a parcel that is legally sized or shaped for drilling. Thus, by refusing 
to allow one’s land to be included in the oil and gas development unit, the dis-
senter would effectively veto his or her neighbors’ ability to develop the oil 
and gas beneath the land. 
This article will explore  the legal  circumstances  of  the  “dissenting land-
owner.” A dissenting landowner is a landowner (or mineral rights owner) who 
does not wish to welcome oil and gas development beneath his or her land but 
is forced into a drilling unit through state-ordered, mandatory pooling or forced  
unitization.5 The dissenting landowner does  not wish to enter into an oil and 
gas development or  production lease  and is  not interested  in  economic  gain 
from sign-on bonuses or royalty payments. 
1.  A drilling unit is a minimum acreage requirement that must be secured by a driller before a well 
can be drilled. O HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01(G) (LexisNexis 2018). 
2.  Thirty-nine  states  have  extensive oil  and  gas laws  that  provide  for  some  sort  of compulsory 
pooling or unitization of an unwilling landowner’s land. These include: Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Tennessee, Illinois,  Kentucky, New York, 
North  Dakota,  Vermont,  Nevada,  Arizona,  Kansas, Oklahoma,  Ohio, Alabama,  Montana,  Utah, 
Arkansas, California, Florida,  Georgia,  Michigan,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New  Mexico, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Colorado, and Wyoming.  See Frank Sylvester & 
Robert W. Malmsheimer, Oil and Gas Spacing and Forced Pooling Requirements: How States Balance 
Energy Development and Landowner Rights , 40 U. DAYTON L. REV. 47, 59–60 (2015). 
3.  Ohio law defines correlative rights as “the reasonable opportunity to every person entitled thereto 
to recover and receive the oil and gas in and under the person’s tract or tracts, or the equivalent thereof, 
without having to drill unnecessary wells or incur other unnecessary expense.” § 1509.01(I). 
4. Correlative rights are “the reasonable opportunity to every person entitled thereto to recover and 
receive the oil and gas in and under his tract or tracts, or the equivalent thereof, without having to drill 
unnecessary wells or incur other unnecessary expense.”  See Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002, 1005  
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
5.  “Dissenting landowner”  is  not  a legal  term,  but  rather  a  term  the  author  coined  to  describe  a 
landowner who objects to the development of the oil and gas resources beneath the land in a context 
where surrounding landowners prefer the resource be developed.  
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This article will explore the history and nature of the mandatory pooling and 
forced  unitization laws  that  force  dissenting landowners  into drilling  units. 6  It 
will describe the tension between the dissenting landowner’s property rights and 
the neighboring landowners’ correlative rights. Using Ohio as an example, this 
article will  describe  how  states  use  mandatory pooling  and  forced  unitization 
laws to favor the correlative rights of consenting landowners over the property 
rights of dissenting landowners. Finally, it will consider various statutory, regula-
tory, common law, and constitutional methods of redress available to the dissent-
ing landowner. It will consider these methods of redress during three periods of 
time: prior to being forced into a drilling unit, during the mandatory pooling or 
forced  unitization  process,  and following  the  issuance  of a  mandatory pooling  
or forced unitization order.  
I. BACKGROUND 
States developed mandatory pooling and unitization statutes in response to the 
shortcomings of the traditional rules for allocating mineral estate rights between 
two or more competing landowners. 7 This Part will discuss the use of the tradi-
tional rule of capture for allocating property rights to subsurface oil and gas. It 
will then elaborate on the rule’s shortcomings and the resulting need for well- 
spacing  and drilling  unit  size  and  shape  requirements. Finally,  this  Part will 
describe  the  rise  of  mandatory pooling  and  forced  unitization  statutes  and  the 
consequent emergence of the dissenting landowner.  
A. THE TRADITIONAL ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
In property law,  ferae naturae refers to “wild animals and other resources that 
do not respect human delineated property boundaries.” 8 Ownership status of ferae  
naturae is determined according to the rule of capture 9 which states that the mere 
pursuit of a wild animal does not establish ownership. Rather, to acquire owner-
ship of a wild animal, a person must capture it. 10 Courts have also applied the rule  
6.  See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning  § 1 (2015) (stating that the right to improve property is 
subject  to the reasonable  exercise of state  or municipality  enforcement  of valid zoning and land use  
restrictions); see also  20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 1 (2015) (stating that a 
covenant is an agreement compelling a landowner to do, or to refrain from doing, certain things with 
respect to real property); 58 A M. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (2015) (stating that the law of nuisance seeks to 
restrict  a landowner’s  right  to use  his  or  her land  in a  manner that substantially  impairs  the  right of 
another to peacefully enjoy his or her property).  
7.  See Kevin  L. Colosimo  & Daniel  P.  Craig, Compulsory Pooling  and  Unitization  in  the 
Marcellus Shale: Pennsylvania’s Challenges and Opportunities , 83 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 47 (2012); see 
also Sharon  O. Flanery  &  Ryan  J.  Morgan, Overview  of Pooling  and  Unitization  Affecting 
Appalachian Shale Development ,  32  ENERGY  &  MIN.  L.  INST.  §  13.04  (2011); Sylvester  & 
Malmsheimer, supra note 2, at 47.  
8.  Ferae naturae, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).  
9.  State v. Shaw, 65 N.E. 875 (Ohio 1902).  
10. See generally , Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).  
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of capture to establishing property rights in the oil and gas under one’s land. 11 
Like wild animals that do not respect property boundaries, freely flowing oil and 
gas also migrate across property lines. Due to the often-migratory nature of oil  
and gas, courts consider it a fugitive resource that one must capture—by remov- 
ing it from the ground12—to establish property rights. 13  In other words, whoever 
brings the oil and gas from an underground pool to the surface, thus capturing it,  
gains property rights to those resources.14 
Although oil and gas trapped in shale rock does not migrate across property 
lines  in  the  same  way  as oil  and  gas  trapped  in larger  underground pools,  the 
requirement of capture to establish ownership applies to shale oil and gas devel-
opment as well. 15 It is the “fugitive nature of hydrocarbons” that causes the rule 
of  capture  to  attach  to shale oil  and  gas. 16 Therefore,  it  is immaterial  that  the 
driller unnaturally causes the shale to fracture in order to release the oil and gas. 17 
To  capture  and  therefore  gain  ownership  of  underground oil  and  gas, land-
owners  had  to drill  a well  on  their  own land. 18 As  a result, landowners  over- 
drilled surface land in efforts to capture the underground resources and protect  
their ownership rights.19 In oil-rich areas, landscapes became covered with spin-
dle wells,  causing  enormous  damage  to  surface land,  an  unfortunate  aesthetic,  
and  reducing  underground  pressure.20 Because wells  depend  on  underground 
pressure to release oil and gas resources to the surface, this resulted in inefficient  
production;21 producers were unable to extract the same yield on a per well basis, 
and more wells were required to accomplish the same level of production. 22  At 
the same time, the rule of capture failed to protect a landowner’s correlative right 
to realize the value of oil and gas.  
11.  Lucas P. Baker, Forced Into Fracking: Mandatory Pooling In Ohio , 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 215, 218  
(2014); see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948). 
12. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897).  
13.  Baker, supra note 11, at 219; Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. Dewitt, 18 A. 724, 725 
(Pa. 1889) (explaining that “possession of the land. . . is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an 
adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills beneath his own land, and taps your gas so that it comes into 
his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his”).  
14.  Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – an Oil and Gas Perspective , 35  
ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005).   
15.  Jared B. Fish, The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Behavioral Analysis of Landowner Decision-  
Making, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 251 (explaining that in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy  
Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), the Texas Supreme Court held that the rule of capture governed property 
rights over the oil and gas recovered in a hydraulic fracturing operation, and that salt water injections 
into the well did not constitute a trespass).  
16.  Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 12–13.  
17.  Id.  
18.  Id.  
19.  Baker, supra note 11, at 219–20.  
20. See generally Sylvester & Malmsheimer,  supra note 2, at 47–48.  
21.  Baker, supra note 11, at 220.  
22.  Id.  
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To relieve surface lands of the adverse effects of over-drilling and to promote 
more efficient drilling, state legislatures enacted rules both for adequate spacing 
between wells and for acreage requirements. 23 Spacing requirements would pre-
vent over-drilling of the surface, while acreage requirements would ensure suffi-
cient  sub-surface  space  to allow drillers  to  take  advantage  of  the natural 
underground pressure. These spacing and acreage requirements for drilling units 
now govern the size and location of legally permissible wells. 
For example, state legislatures enacted laws mandating that “drilling units” 24 
be secured by a driller before a well can be drilled. 25 The land in a drilling unit  
must be contiguous.26 Drilling unit provisions specify that a new well cannot be 
drilled within a certain distance of a pre-existing well. 27 Therefore, a driller must 
secure a minimum acreage of well-free land before a drilling permit can be issued 
to that driller. 28 For example, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (“Ohio 
DNR”) Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“DOGRM”) promul-
gated  Ohio  Administrative  Code  1501:9-01-04,  which established drilling  unit 
size, shape, and spacing rules. The distance required between wells and the dril-
ling unit’s required size depends on the depth of the planned oil and gas well. 29  A 
driller trying to access oil and gas at the Utica shale’s greatest depths of 7,000 
feet would need to establish a drilling unit of at least forty acres, 30  1,000 feet 
from an existing well capable of accessing the same pool, 31 and set back at least 
500  feet  from  any  boundary  of  the drilling  unit. 32 However,  a shallower well, 
such as one only 2,000 to 4,000 feet deep, may occur on a much smaller drilling 
unit of at least twenty acres, 33 600 feet from an existing well capable of accessing 
the same pool, 34 and set back at least 300 feet from the boundary of the drilling  
unit.35 
The  new  size  and  shape  requirements  for drilling  units  do  not  come  free 
from their own limitations. Forming a legally sized and shaped drilling unit of-
ten requires the cooperation of multiple landowners. If one landowner refuses 
to add his or her land to the drilling unit, this dissenting landowner frustrates 
the  other landowners’ abilities  to develop  the  resources  beneath  their 
23. Colosimo & Craig,  supra note 7, at 47, 53.  
24.  See,  e.g.,  OHIO  ADMIN.  CODE  §  1501:9-1-04  (2005);  N.Y.  ENVTL.  CONSERV.  L.  §  23-0501  
(McKinney 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-7 (2012); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b) (West 2017).  
25.  Id.  
26.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.24 (LexisNexis 2018)  
27.  Id.  
28.  See id.  
29.  See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501:9-1-04.  
30.  See § 1501:9-1-04(C)(4).  
31.  Id.  
32.  Hobart King, Utica Shale – The Natural Gas Giant Below the Marcellus , GEOLOGY.COM, http:// 
geology.com/articles/utica-shale/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).  
33.  See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501:9-1-04(C)(3).  
34.  Id.  
35.  See § 1501:9-1-04.  
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respective properties. States across the country enacted legislation to address 
circumstances  in  which  a single landowner,  or  a  minority  of landowners, 
declines to surrender a land or mineral rights interest that is critical to forming 
a legally sized or shaped drilling unit. The primary goal of these statutes was to 
promote development of the resource. They also protect the oil and gas devel-
opment rights of the landowners who voluntarily sign development leases with  
producers. 
Ohio, for example, created its own versions of the two widely-used statutory 
mechanisms to address the problem of the  dissenting landowner: mandatory 
pooling and forced unitization. 36 Like similar laws in other states, Ohio’s man-
datory pooling and forced unitization laws protect the correlative rights of the 
landowners—assuming they represent the majority of development rights own-
ers in the potential drilling unit—who wish to develop their underground min-
eral rights. If an oil and gas producer can obtain voluntary development leases 
from a majority of the mineral rights owners in a proposed unit, 37 the producer 
can apply for a mandatory pooling or forced unitization order from the Chief of 
the Ohio DNR, DOGRM. If the Chief of DOGRM approves the application, 
the  dissenting  owner’s land  or mineral  rights  interest will  be mandatorily 
“pooled” or “unitized” by force—joined to the drilling unit—despite his or her 
opposition. While the dissenting landowner will still receive a royalty interest 
if oil or gas is produced, the landowner is deprived of several other economic 
benefits, discussed more fully below. 38  
B. MANDATORY POOLING AND UNITIZATION: DEFINITIONS AND DIFFERENCES 
The casual conversationalist understandably  conflates  or  misuses  the  terms 
“mandatory pooling” and “forced unitization.” Both terms protect the majority 
mineral rights owners’ correlative rights and are grounded in the principle that 
inefficient drilling should  be  prevented  through  strategic development  of  min-
eral-rich areas where a majority of landowners have agreed to develop. However, 
despite their similar purposes, mandatory pooling and forced unitization are dif- 
ferent concepts authorized by different code sections.39  
36.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.27–1509.28 (LexisNexis 2018). 
37.  “Unit” is synonymous with “drilling unit.” Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897).  
38.  Marie C. Baca, Forced Pooling: When Landowners Can’t Say No to Drilling , PRO PUBLICA (May 
18, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/forced-pooling-when-landowners-cant-say-no-to-drilling .  
39.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.26 (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that “owners of adjoining tracts 
may agree to pool the tracts to form a drilling unit”); § 1509.27; Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (stating that “[m]andatory pooling is authorized under R.C. 1509.27 where, after 
an unsuccessful attempt to voluntarily pool on a just and equitable basis, forced pooling is necessary to 
protect correlative rights”).  
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1. What is Mandatory Pooling? 
Pooling is the joining of small tracts of land for the purpose of meeting a state’s 
regulatory requirements. 40 Mandatory pooling, then, is the requirement that pool-
ing  happen  with  respect  to  a  given parcel.  Mandatory pooling laws  arose  in 
response to well-spacing requirements 41 and give individual landowners, or min-
eral rights owners, the ability to meet the state’s minimum acreage requirements 
for  a drilling  unit  by  forcing  their  neighbors  to consolidate land. 42  Mandatory 
pooling statutes protect the right of the majority  of landowners to develop the 
underground resource because, with the inclusion of the dissenter’s land, the ma-
jority is able to satisfy the state’s spacing requirements. Without mandatory pool-
ing, the majority of landowners would be prevented from using their land as they 
please. Thus, mandatory pooling protects the rights of the larger group to develop 
the resource at the expense of the smaller dissenting group’s property rights. 
“Pooling” is usually voluntary, not mandatory. 43 Landowners create voluntary 
pooling agreements through a pooling clause in a lease agreement between the 
mineral rights owner and the drilling company—often called the producer. 44 The 
pooling clause authorizes the producer to combine the lessor’s land with neigh-
boring lands to form a drilling unit. In return, the lessor receives a royalty interest 
payable as a proportion of the proceeds from the entire unit as measured by the 
amount of property the landowner owns in the unit. 45 
When a mineral rights owner or landowner refuses to sign a lease agreement, 
the landowner is refusing to authorize the producer’s use of that land to help form 
a drilling unit. Without the dissenter’s land or mineral rights, it might be impossi-
ble to  form  a legally  sized or  shaped drilling  unit. Mandatory pooling statutes 
apply  when  a landowner,  or  producer,  cannot  meet  the  acreage  or  spacing 
requirement alone  but  has  the  agreement  of  most  of  his  or  her  neighbors  to 
include their land in the pool to meet the statutory requirements. A developer, or 
a group of landowners, may petition the Ohio DNR for a mandatory pooling order 
when he or she is unable to meet the acreage requirement alone but has the con-
sent of a majority of neighboring landowners to add their land to the unit. 46  The 
landowner who refuses to join the drilling unit voluntarily could find his or her land 
joined to the drilling unit by a mandatory pooling order from the Ohio DNR. 47 
Mandatory pooling  statutes  are  an  exception  to  the general rule  that land-
owners decide who may enter their land and how to use the land. Without a parcel  
40.  Id.  
41.  Baker, supra note 11, at 215, 221–22. 
42. Colosimo & Craig,  supra note 7, at 47, 51–52.  
43.  See § 1509.26.  
44.  KRISTA WEIDNER, A LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO LEASING LAND IN PENNSYLVANIA 19 (2013), available 
at https://extension.psu.edu/natural-gas-exploration-a-landowners-guide-to-leasing-in-pennsylvania .  
45.  Id.  
46.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27.  
47.  See §§ 1509.27–1509.28.  
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that meets the statutory requirements however, the landowners who had hoped to 
develop their mineral resources and had entered into pooling agreements would 
be deprived of the ability to develop the resource. A single dissenting landowner 
would effectively hold hostage the oil and gas development opportunity of his or 
her neighbors. This would mean lost economic opportunity for the landowners 
who hope to produce oil or gas. It would also mean a valuable resource lays unde-
veloped and outside the state’s economy. By enacting and applying mandatory 
pooling laws, states opted to protect the correlative rights of the developing land-
owners over the property rights of the dissenting landowner.  
2. What is Forced Unitization? 
Unlike mandatory pooling, unitization is not concerned with meeting regula- 
tory demands or requirements.48 Instead, unitization is the large-scale consoli-
dation  of mineral  or leasehold  interests  covering all  or  part  of  a  common 
source or supply. 49 Unitization laws encourage economically efficient develop-
ment  of mineral  resources  by  identifying large  areas  of land  above natural 
resource formations and ensuring that the natural resource formation is drained 
efficiently. 
The primary function of unit operation is to maximize production by efficiently  
draining the reservoir through the use of the best engineering techniques economi-
cally feasible. 50 Like pooling, unitization can occur in either a voluntary or forced  
manner.51 However, unitization differs from pooling because it does not concern the 
state’s  minimum  acreage  requirement  or well-spacing  requirements. 52  Rather,  it 
attempts to make oil and gas production efficient by allowing the consolidation of 
mineral rights for an area of land above underground reservoirs of resources. 53  A 
“unit area” can be huge and may encompass several “pooled units.” 54 The goal of 
unitization is to create an area large enough and of the best shape to serve the best- 
practice needs of the driller, often due to the type of drilling equipment being used. 55 
Like mandatory pooling, forced unitization prevents dissenting mineral rights own- 
ers within the unit area from preventing the efficient production of the underground  
formation.56   
48. Colosimo & Craig,  supra note 7, at 51–52.  
49.  Id.  
50.  Id.  
51.  Id.  
52.  Id.  
53.  Id.  
54.  Id.  
55.  Id.  
56.  Id.  
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Efficient development  of shale plays 57 is  expensive58  and  often  requires  the 
developer to secure development rights to significant acreage. This was not possi-
ble  when developers  were limited  to drilling  and  fracturing vertical wells. 
Vertical wells could not cover large horizontal areas underground, instead requir-
ing many more wells on the surface, which was not possible due to spacing and 
acreage requirements. However, when horizontal drilling was coupled with hy-
draulic  fracturing, larger-scale development  of shale fields  became possible. 59 
Although hydraulic fracturing still requires developers to obtain mineral rights to 
large tracts of land, developers no longer need surface rights to most of the land; 
instead, they need the right to access it from below. To provide developers access 
to the below-ground space, mineral rights leases can be joined together to form a 
larger, sufficiently-sized unit, sometimes against a mineral rights holder’s wishes. 
Applicants for unitization—usually the driller or production company—must 
show that the development of the oil or gas is not economically viable without  
the unitization designation.60 To receive a unitization designation, the developer 
or driller must show that having control over the mineral rights of a very large 
area of land is “reasonably necessary to increase substantially the ultimate recov-
ery  of oil  and  the value  of  the  estimated additional  recovery  of  the oil  or  gas 
exceeds the estimated additional cost.” 61 The unitization applicant seeks to de-
velop a large underground pool as a single unit, thus making its equipment opera- 
tion  more  efficient  and  minimizing  surface  disturbance  to  the  area  above  the 
pool. This usually occurs with large parcels of land and large underground pools 
for which the developer may need to drill long distances horizontally beneath the  
ground.62  
C. RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY VERSUS RIGHTS OF THE DISSENTING LANDOWNER 
The basic common law property rights described in the proverbial bundle of 
rights include the right to use, exclude, and control the disposition of one’s prop- 
erty. These rights provide the core of the American conception of what it means 
to own property. They are widely recognized in the United States and are demon-
strated each time a landowner posts a “No Trespassing” sign. The concepts of  
57. A shale play  is  a “shale  formation[]  containing  significant accumulations  of natural  gas  and 
which  share[s  other] similar 0 0 0geographic  properties.” What  is Shale  Gas? ,  GEOLOGY.COM,  https:// 
geology.com/energy/shale-gas (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).  
58. Sylvester & Malmsheimer,  supra note 2, at 47–49.  
59.  Id.  
60.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28.  
61.  Id.; see also  BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 
§ 1.02 (3d ed. 2008). Consideration: The fact that shale gas does not “move,” or migrate as described 
above,  suggests  that  unitization,  not pooling, would  be  the  better  method  to  measure drilling  units. 
Perhaps there would be less surface disruption if the cubic feet of subsurface natural gas was used to 
measure  how much land should be in a  unit—instead of considering how many wells can be drilled  
based on the surface area.  
62.  Id.  
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mandatory pooling and forced unitization directly contradict these basic property 
rights because they enable drilling beneath a landowner’s land against that land-
owner’s wishes, obviating the landowner’s right to exclude non-owners and to 
use the land as he or she chooses. 
Under traditional common law, a landowner controls the right to use, or  not 
use, property in any legal and reasonable way. 63 However, problems arise when 
an oil or gas producer cannot obtain voluntary leases from every contiguous land 
or mineral rights owner within the proposed drilling unit or pool to form a suit-
ably sized and shaped drilling unit. For instance, if a legally-sized drilling unit 
encompasses  the mineral  interests  of  sixty  separate landowners  and only  one 
landowner refuses to consent to his or her land’s inclusion, whose rights should 
prevail? This tension between the correlative rights of the fifty-nine consenting 
landowners and the property rights of the sole dissenting landowner illustrates the 
tension between correlative rights and traditional property rights. 
Because  subsurface  rights  are  not  as clear  as  surface  rights,  questions  often  
arise  regarding  the  scope  of  a  property  owner’s  interest  in  the  subsurface. 
Historically, courts used the maxim  “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum  
et  ad  inferos”—a  man’s  property  extends  from  the  heavens  to  the  core  of  the 
earth—to describe the extent of property ownership, but this interpretation is long  
outdated.64 In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply this doctrine to the 
air used by airplanes flying above the plaintiff’s property. 65 Similarly, the Ohio 
Supreme Court rejected a landowner’s claim for subsurface trespass, holding that 
a landowner’s “subsurface ownership rights are limited.” 66 In rejecting the land-
owner’s argument, the court explained that the landowner’s “subsurface property 
rights are not absolute and in these circumstances are contingent upon interfer-
ence with the reasonable and foreseeable use of the properties.” 67 
Like the property rights in the “bundle of sticks,” correlative rights, or the right 
to develop the resources beneath one’s land, also are central to the American con-
ception of what it means to own property. The rationale behind correlative rights 
is that landowners have the right to develop and cultivate their own land without 
being held hostage to the exerted property rights of dissenting landowners. 
63.  However,  a landowner’s  property  rights  are  not absolute.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  a 
landowner’s property rights may be limited. Under the common law, a landowner’s rights are limited by 
concepts such as the doctrine of nuisance, or through the placement of servitudes. Property rights may 
also be restricted through statutory mechanisms, such as zoning.  
64.  Restatement (First) of Torts § 159 (1934); Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, the Restatement, and  
Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203, 204 (2011).  
65.  Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936). 
66.  Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996); see also Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008) (recognizing the same limitations of the  “cujus” 
doctrine when the alleged trespass took place far beneath one’s property).  
67.  Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 993.  
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II. THE EXAMPLE OF  OHIO: USE OF  MANDATORY POOLING AND UNITIZATION TO  
PROTECT  THE  CORRELATIVE  RIGHTS  OF  THE  MAJORITY 
The doctrine of correlative rights protects a property owner’s ability to extract 
gas and oil. Today, Ohio’s mandatory pooling and forced unitization laws portray 
a clear preference for these correlative rights over traditional property rights. In 
Ohio,  unitization applications  and  orders substantially  outnumber  mandatory 
pooling applications and orders. 68 This Part will describe the processes for both 
mandatory pooling and forced unitization in Ohio as an example of concepts that 
are broadly applicable to dissenting landowners in the United States.  
A. MANDATORY POOLING APPLIED: THE EXAMPLE OF OHIO 
To obtain a drilling permit in Ohio, an applicant must first propose a drilling 
unit that meets the regulatory acreage and spacing requirements established by  
the Ohio DNR.69 If the applicant’s tract of land does not meet the minimum acre-
age  requirements  and  the applicant  is unable  to  meet  them  through voluntary 
pooling arrangements provided in Section 1509.26 of the Ohio Revised Code, 70 
he or she may apply for a mandatory pooling order. 71 An applicant can apply for 
a mandatory pooling order only if: the tract of land is of insufficient size or shape 
to comply with the requirements for drilling a well, the tract owner is also the 
mineral rights owner, and the tract owner is unable to form a drilling unit by vol-
untary lease agreement on a just and equitable basis. 72 The application must con-
tain information that is “reasonably required” by DOGRM and a separate permit  
pursuant to Section 1509.05 of the Ohio Revised Code.73 
The DOGRM Chief must notify all landowners within the proposed unit of the 
filing of the mandatory pooling application and of the landowners’ right to a hear- 
ing.74 After an applicant submits a pooling application, the Ohio DNR conducts a 
hearing to weigh the costs and benefits of pooling. The Ohio DNR has significant 
discretion  in  determining  whether  a  mandatory pooling  order  is  “necessary  to  
68.  See Telephone Interview with Steve Opritza, Ohio Department of Natural Resources Division of 
Oil and Gas Resources Management (January 18, 2018) (explaining that the Division has received 206 
unitization applications since November 2011, compared to a mere twenty-seven pooling applications 
since 2011) (notes on file with author).  
69.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.24; see also  OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501:9-1-04 (2005) (stating the 
rules regarding acreage requirements and spacing of wells, which are determined by the depth of the 
wells). 
70.  § 1509.26 (stating that owners of adjoining tracts may agree to pool the tracts to form a drilling 
unit  that  conforms to the  minimum acreage  and distance requirements of the division  of oil and gas  
resources management).  
71.  § 1509.27.  
72.  §§ 1509.27–1509.28.  
73.  Id. This permit permits the holder to drill a new well, drill an existing well deeper, reopen a well, 
or convert a well to any use other than its original purpose, or plug back a well.  
74.  Id.  
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protect correlative rights and to provide effective development, use, and conser-
vation of oil and gas.” 75 
Following the hearing, the Chief may approve the application if he or she is 
“satisfied that the application is in proper form and that mandatory pooling is nec-
essary to protect correlative rights and provide effective development, use, and 
conservation  of oil  and  gas.” 76  An  order  must  describe  to  whom  the  order  is 
issued, the boundaries of the drilling unit and production site, the pro rata portion 
of production to the owner of each pooled tract, and other specific details regard-
ing the driller’s proposed plan. 77 If the order is granted, “any person adversely 
affected” by the order may appeal to the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission to vacate  
or modify it.78 A landowner has several statutory recourses for appealing Ohio 
DNR’s order to pool his or her land, described in Part IV. 79 
Ohio law  provides  strong  incentives  for landowners  to lease  their mineral 
rights voluntarily to gas and oil companies. The first incentive is the signing bo-
nus the landowner receives for voluntarily leasing his or her minerals. The pool-
ing of land through a mandatory pooling order, rather than voluntarily, does not 
provide the landowner with a signing bonus, yet the land will be treated as if it 
were under lease. 80  
The second, and perhaps strongest, incentive is the statutory terms and condi-
tions to which a “non-participating landowner”—one who has not joined a dril-
ling  unit voluntarily—is  subject  when  his  or  her land  is pooled  by  order.  The 
statute provides that if a producer drills a well that benefits a non-participating 
landowner, the producer is entitled  to receive  from the  non-participating land-
owner a share of the producer’s costs for drilling, equipping, and operating the 
well, including a “penalty” which could amount to 200 percent of these afore- 
mentioned costs.81 Under this statutory scheme, the Ohio DNR Chief may also 
subject  the  non-participating  and  now mandatorily pooled landowner  to  any 
terms and conditions that he deems “reasonable and just.” 82 This method is char-
acterized as a “risk-penalty approach.” 83 
To illustrate the risk-penalty approach, assume a landowner (“L”) refuses to 
enter into a pooling unit voluntarily with a driller (“D”). As a result, the DOGRM 
Chief issues a mandatory pooling order against L, forcing L’s land into a drilling 
unit. L now has two options. Under option one, L can agree to enter voluntarily 
into the pooling unit, notwithstanding the Chief’s mandatory pooling order. 84  L  
75.  § 1509.27.  
76.  Id.  
77.  Id.  
78.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (LexisNexis 2018).  
79.  Id.  
80.  § 1509.27; see also  Baker, supra note 11, at 215, 227.  
81.  § 1509.27  
82.  Id.  
83.  Baker, supra note 11, at 215, 227.  
84.  Id.  
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must pay her reasonable portion of the costs and expenses associated with the 
drilling activity. L is then considered to have a working interest in the operation 
and shares in the risks associated with the drilling operations. 85 Under option two, 
L can refuse to enter voluntarily into the drilling unit. 86 In this case, the Chief will 
apply the risk-penalty approach. 87 Under the mandatory pooling order, L’s land 
will be incorporated into the drilling unit against L’s wishes. 88 L will forego a 
signing bonus but will not be required to contribute her portion of the reasonable 
costs and expenses right away. Only if the well is successful will L be required to 
contribute  her  portion  of reasonable  costs  and  expenses. 89 These  costs will  be 
taken from L’s proportionate share of the royalties to which she is entitled as part 
of the drilling unit. 90 Because she did not share in the drilling operation’s upfront 
risks,  the  Chief  can  add  an additional “risk-penalty”  to  the total  costs  and 
expenses for which L is responsible, not to exceed 200 percent of L’s share of the 
costs and expenses. Therefore, under option two, if the well is successful, L will 
not realize any profit from her land’s participation in the drilling unit until the 
well has produced enough oil and gas to cover her proportionate share of the costs 
and expenses as well as any risk-penalty assessed against her by the Chief. 91 
Third,  in  addition  to  the explicit  economic  detriments  accruing  to  the  non- 
participating landowner,  Ohio’s  mandatory pooling  statute  deprives  these land-
owners of the opportunity to negotiate the terms and conditions that will apply to 
their property and to how it will be used. 92 The dissenting landowner may appeal 
this order to the Oil and Gas Commission, and then, if necessary, to the Franklin 
County Common Pleas Court. 93 However, in most cases, the fate of the application 
is decided in the initial Ohio DNR review process. 94 The Chief of DOGRM has 
substantial discretion in determining the fate of a dissenting landowner’s property.  
B. FORCED UNITIZATION APPLIED IN OHIO 
Like mandatory pooling, forced unitization adds previously uncommitted land-
owners to a drilling unit when an applicant meets certain statutory requirements. 95 
Ohio’s  unitization  statute  requires  that  sixty-five  percent  of  a drilling  unit  be 
voluntarily leased in order to submit an application to add unleased land to the   
85.  Id.  
86.  Id.  
87.  Id.  
88.  Id.  
89.  Id.  
90.  Id.  
91.  Id.; see also  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27.  
92.  Baker, supra note 11, at 215, 232.  
93.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.36–1509.37 (LexisNexis 2018).  
94.  See  Mandatory Pooling ,  ODNR  DIV.  OF  OIL  &  GAS  RES., http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/ 
regulatory-sections/legal/mandatory-pooling (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).  
95.  § 1509.28.  
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Ohio  DNR.96 Ohio law  does  not  draw  a  distinction  in  its  unitization  statute  
between secondary recovery operation and primary operation.97 Procedurally, the 
application,  notice,  and  hearing  requirements  are similar  to  Ohio’s  mandatory 
pooling statute. 98 
Ohio’s system for unit operation of a pool includes prerequisites for submitting 
a unitization application to DOGRM. 99 In particular, only DOGRM’s Chief or the 
owners of at least sixty-five percent of a proposed unit may submit an application 
to hold a hearing “to consider the need for the operation as a unit of an entire pool  
or  part  thereof.”100 The application  must  be  accompanied  by  a non-refundable 
$10,000 fee and any additional information the Chief may request. 101 
After the application is submitted, the Chief will issue the order if he finds that 
“such operation is reasonably necessary to increase substantially the ultimate re-
covery of oil and gas and the value of the estimated additional recovery exceeds 
the  estimated additional  cost  incident  to  conducting  the  operation.” 102  An  
approved order must describe: to whom the order is issued, the boundaries of the 
drilling unit and production site, an allocation of the oil and gas produced based 
on the proportionate share of each unitized tract, and any additional provisions 
deemed appropriate for unit operations and the protection of correlative rights. 103 
An order will not become effective without the written approval of sixty-five per-
cent of the working interest owners—the producers—as well as sixty-five percent 
of the royalty interest owners. 104 
As with the mandatory pooling requirements, a landowner has several statutory 
recourses for appealing the Chief’s decision to issue a unitization order, 105 which 
will be discussed below. 
Ohio’s DOGRM receives far fewer unitization applications than it does man-
datory pooling applications. 106 Since 2012, the DOGRM Chief has issued only  
ten unitization orders pursuant to Section 1509.28 of the Ohio Revised Code. The 
issued  orders  suggest several  observations  about  the  manner  in  which  Ohio’s 
unitization law is used. First, oil and gas producers seem not to be abusing the 
process to avoid seeking voluntary leases with landowners. In all but one of the 
orders issued since 2012, producers obtained voluntary leases on approximately  
96.  Id.  
97.  Id.; see Bruce M. Kramer, Unitization: A Partial Solution to the Issues Raised by Horizontal Well 
Development in Shale Plays , 68 ARK. L. REV. 295, 311 (2015) (discussing the evolution of compulsory 
unitization statutes and Louisiana’s limited unitization statute, which only applied to secondary recovery 
projects that recycled gas in order to prevent waste and the drilling of unnecessary wells).  
98.  § 1509.28.  
99.  Id.  
100.  Id.  
101.  Id.  
102.  Id.  
103.  Id.  
104.  Id.  
105.  Id.  
106.  Opritza Interview, supra note 68.  
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ninety percent of the proposed drilling unit, far exceeding the statutory require- 
ment of sixty-five percent.107 The caveat though, is the statutory-based incentives, 
discussed  above,  which heavily  induce  a landowner  to lease voluntarily rather 
than by the Chief’s order. Still, the most dramatic unitization proposed to unitize 
only thirteen percent of the unit area. 108  The tendency of producers to far exceed 
the statutory minimum of voluntary leasees suggests either that the incentives are 
extremely persuasive to landowners or that producers prefer to obtain voluntary 
leases rather than to use the legal mechanism of forced unitization. Alternatively, 
this trend suggests that the Ohio DNR prefers a producer to extend his or her leas-
ing efforts beyond the statutory minimum. Regardless of which is true, oil and 
gas producers are not commonly or easily using the unitization process to circum-
vent having to obtain voluntary leases with landowners. 
In several instances, the applicant did not obtain voluntary leases before mak-
ing the unitization request to the Chief. Instead, the applicant obtained “volun-
teers” after submitting the application but before the Ohio DOGRM issued the 
order. Producers can continue their efforts to obtain voluntary leases even after 
submitting  the  unitization application.  One could  therefore  attribute  the  pro-
ducers’ success in recruiting volunteers to landowners “seeing the writing on the 
wall” and preferring to submit “voluntarily” to the unit by signing a lease rather 
than  fighting  the  agency  and potentially  suffering  the  adverse  statutory  conse-
quences of being a non-participating landowner. 109 Alternatively, producers may 
be more inclined to offer lucrative leases at this stage to avoid a forced unitization 
proceeding, thus enticing more “voluntary” participation. Regardless, producers 
continue  their leasing  efforts  even  after  they  have  submitted  unitization 
applications.  
C. “MANDATORY POOLING” VERSUS “UNITIZATION” ACCORDING TO THE OHIO OIL AND  
GAS COMMISSION 
The difference between the applicability of mandatory pooling and forced unit-
ization has perplexed readers of the Ohio statute. The statute thinly defines man-
datory pooling  and  forced  unitization. 110 In  some  states,  the relevant  statutes 
more clearly define the circumstances in which the applicant should request man-
datory pooling rather than forced unitization. 111 For example, North Dakota, like 
Ohio,  has  separate pooling  and  unitization  statutes.  However,  North  Dakota 
explains the functional difference between the two concepts. 112 North Dakota law 
states that pooling should be used when “there are separately owned interests in  
107.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28.  
108.  Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res. Mgmt, Order No. 2014-71 (March 26, 2014).  
109.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27; see also infra  Part.II.B.  
110.  See §§ 1509.27–1509.28.  
111.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (2017) (defining and setting forth the criteria for compelled 
pooling); cf. § 38-08-09.4 (2017) (defining and setting forth the criteria for compelled unitization).  
112.  See §§ 38-08-07–09 (2017); cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.24.  
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all or a part of [a] spacing unit,” and pooling is necessary to form a legal spacing  
unit.113 However, unitization should be used when parties wish to combine their  
separate operations for the purpose of optimizing “repressuring or pressure main-
tenance  operations, cycling  or recycling  operations, 0 0 0or  any  other  method  of  
operation.”114 North Dakota’s statutes draw a clear distinction between the con-
cepts and explain when each should apply. 
Some  states  have clarified  the  distinction  by simply  adopting  one  over  the  
other.115 In Ohio, however, the difference is not defined but rather “understood.” 
Both the mandatory pooling and forced unitization statutes allow an oil and gas 
producer to ask the DOGRM Chief for an order to include land in a drilling area 
even when the landowner objects. But when should the applicant use one section 
of the law rather than the other? 
In September 2015, the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission (“the Commission”) 
ruled on a forced unitization case that highlights the lack of statutory clarity in 
Ohio’s oil and gas statute regarding when the forced unitization section, rather 
than  the  mandatory pooling  section, applies.  In Teeter Revocable  Trust  v. 
Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management, R.E. Gas Development, LLC 
(“Rex”),  sought  to drill  four horizontal wells. 116 Rex  had  secured control  of 
eighty-eight percent of the necessary land for the drilling unit. However, due to 
its size and shape, the unit required two additional tracts—one owned by Teeter 
and another owned by a separate landowner. 117 Teeter declined all offers to vol-
untarily unitize, and Rex requested the Chief to issue a unitization order to force 
inclusion  of  Teeter’s  farm  in  the  proposed drilling  unit. 118 The  Chief obliged,  
issuing the order under the terms of Ohio’s forced unitization statute.119 
Ohio law requires sixty-five percent of the unit’s mineral leases to be entered 
into voluntarily for the Chief to issue a unitization order with respect to the rest of 
the necessary land. 120 However, if the applicant seeks a mandatory pooling order, 
the applicant needs to control ninety percent of the needed land. 121  Rex sought 
and received a unitization order with eighty-eight percent control of the required 
leases for the unit—well beyond the sixty-five percent required for forced unitiza- 
tion  in  Ohio.122 However,  if  Rex  had  proceeded  under  the  mandatory pooling  
113.  § 38-08-08.  
114.  § 38-08-09.  
115.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116 (2018); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (West 2017);  
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61703 (West 2018). 
116.  Teeter Revocable Tr. v. Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt., Appeal No. 895, at 2 (Ohio Oil and Gas  
Comm’n Sept. 15, 2015).  
117.  Id.  
118.  Id. at 6, 7.  
119.  Id. at 8.  
120.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28.  
121.  Teeter, Appeal No. 895, at 12; see also  § 1509.27.  
122.  Teeter, Appeal No. 895, at 12.  
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statute,  the  company would  have failed  to  satisfy  the  ninety  percent normally 
required under Ohio’s mandatory pooling statute. 123 
The Commission considered the question “[u]nder which statute should the appli-
cant, Rex, be proceeding—mandatory pooling, or unitization.” 124  To make its case  
before the Commission, Rex brought in an expert125 who explained that unitization  
concerns efficiency and industry best practices,126 whereas pooling concerns joining 
sufficient land to meet the statutory size and shape requirements for permitting. 127  
However, this distinction does not appear anywhere in Ohio’s statute.128 
Faced with this lack of statutory clarity, the Commission relied on common  
practice.129 It said that, “in [its] experience,” the pooling statute was used when a 
single well failed  to  meet  spacing  requirements. 130  Because  the  proposed  unit 
included  four wells,  the  Commission  reasoned  the pooling  statute should  not 
apply.131 The Commission wrote that unitization requests target geological for-
mations, like the Utica/Point Pleasant formations for which Rex planned multiple 
horizontal wells. 132 The Commission noted, unlike unitization statutes in other 
states, the Ohio statute says nothing about unitization being limited to secondary 
production  operations.  Teeter appealed  the  Commission’s  decision  to  the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. However, Teeter failed to properly per-
fect his appeal under Section 1509.37 of the Revised Code, 133 and his appeal was 
dismissed only two months after it had been filed. 
Pooling and unitization both refer to the gathering together of land associated 
with oil and gas production. Although some states are clear in their statutes about 
when pooling applies and when unitization applies, some are not. Ohio, for exam-
ple, is not clear in the statutory language, but is clear in application: Pooling is 
used for smaller projects when spacing and boundaries are an issue, and unitiza-
tion is applied when a producer is trying to assemble the rights to efficiently drain  
an underground basin using industry best practices.  
III. DISSENTING  LANDOWNER’S  POSSIBLE  ACTIONS  WHEN  CONFRONTING  MANDATORY  
POOLING  OR  FORCED  UNITIZATION 
The expressed preference for correlative rights over individual property rights 
within  states’  mandatory pooling  and  forced  unitization laws  requires  the  
123.  Id.  
124.  Id.  
125.  Id. at 13.  
126.  Id. at 14.  
127.  Id.  
128.  Id.  
129.  Id.  
130.  Id.  
131.  Id. at 14–15.  
132.  Id. at 15.  
133.  See Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Commission, Teeter Revocable Tr. v. Div. of Oil & 
Gas Res. Mgmt., Appeal No. 895, at 14 (Sept. 17, 2015).  
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dissenting landowners to explore creative ways to protect their property rights. 
This Part reviews the legal landscape in which a dissenting landowner must oper-
ate, exploring the options available to dissenting landowners at three distinct time 
periods: pre-mandatory pooling or forced unitization, during the mandatory pool-
ing  or  forced  unitization  process,  and  post-mandatory pooling  or  forced  
unitization.  
A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR THE DISSENTING LANDOWNER 
The oil and gas industry enjoys significant concessions with regard to the applic-
ability  of federal  and  state regulation. Oil  and  gas  producers  using  the hydraulic 
fracturing process benefit from numerous exemptions from major federal environ-
mental  statutes. 134 For example,  in  1980,  Congress  enacted  the  Comprehensive 
Environmental  Response,  Compensation,  and Liability  Act  (“CERCLA”),  which 
allowed the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to hold potentially responsi-
ble parties liable for the costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. 135  However, 
CERCLA explicitly exempts crude oil, natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied nat-
ural gas, and mixtures of natural gas and synthetic gas from the definition of a haz- 
ardous substance.136 Spills and releases of petroleum, crude oil, and natural gas are 
immune  from federal regulation  under  CERCLA. 137  Furthermore,  in  1988,  the  
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which requires the EPA to determine cri-
teria for identifying hazardous wastes, was rendered toothless when the EPA deter-
mined that regulation of oil field wastes was unnecessary because existing state and 
federal regulations were adequate and the economic impact to the petroleum indus-
try would be great. 138 More recently, the 2005 Energy Policy Act exempted many 
hydraulic fracturing-related activities, including injecting waste fluids underground 
and discharging fluids near navigable waters, from having to obtain permits. 139  
Given  the federal  government’s  hands-off  approach  to  the regulation  of hy-
draulic fracturing, states have enacted their own regulatory frameworks. 140 States 
regulate hydraulic fracturing activities in a number of ways, including the regula-
tion  of  the location  and  spacing  of wells, drilling  methods, oil  and  gas  waste 
134. William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: 
The  Laissez-Faire  Approach  of  the Federal  Government  and  Varying  State Regulations ,  14  VT.  J.  
ENVTL. L. 39, 43 (2012) (stating that the oil and gas industry “enjoys exemptions from several major 
federal environmental statutes, including: the Safe Drinking Water Act; the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act; the Clean Water Act; the 
Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the 
National Environmental Policy Act”).  
135.  Id. at 51.  
136.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (LexisNexis 2018). 
137.  Brady & Crannell,  supra note 134, at 51–52.  
138.  Id. at 46–47.  
139.  See Renee L. Kosnik, The Oil and Gas Industry’s Exclusion and Exemptions to Major Environmental  
Statutes,  at  8  (2007), https://www.earthworksaction.org/publications/the_oil_and_gas_industrys_exclusions_ 
and_exemptions_to_major_environmental_/. 
140.  See Brady & Crannell,  supra note 134, at 53.  
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disposal, and site restoration. All of these issues concern how and where shale oil 
and gas will be developed. 141 Most states administer and enforce these regulations 
through  permitting  and  inspection  requirements,  which  preempt local regula- 
tion.142 However, these state regulatory systems often provide inadequate protec-
tion and recourse for citizens adversely affected by oil or gas production because 
many lack “citizen enforcement provisions,” 143 which provide individuals with 
the statutory  right to challenge companies  that fail to comply with the regula- 
tions.144 Additionally, this lack of citizen enforcement provisions leaves private  
parties without much statutory recourse. 
Federal environmental  statutes largely  do  not  protect  against  harm  derived 
from oil and gas production, and state statutes tend to preempt local regulation of 
oil and gas-related activities. Because the legal system, particularly environmen-
tal statutes, has excised protections that would curtail or control the oil and gas 
industry, landowners  need  to  be  creative  and vigilant  to  protect  their land. 
Landowners must learn to use administrative processes and the common law to  
their best advantage.  
B. PRE-POOLING: PREVENTING A FORCED POOLING OR UNITIZATION ORDER 
This section considers the dissenting landowner’s circumstances “pre-pooling”— 
before the landowner’s land becomes  the subject of a mandatory pooling or 
forced unitization application. This section will discuss the various preventa-
tive  measures  a landowner  may  take  to  prevent  his  or  her land  from  being 
forced into a drilling unit or pool and their varying degrees of likelihood of suc-
cess. The measures seek to prevent oil and gas activities from occurring under 
the dissenting landowner’s property so the property may avoid forced inclusion 
in a pool or unit. They also focus on preventing the extraction of hydrocarbons 
altogether  through private land  use planning tools,  such  as  deed  restrictions 
and conservation easements. Strategies considered include servitudes broadly, 
restrictive  covenants  in particular,  and  conservation  easements.  Easements, 
real covenants, and equitable servitudes allow landowners to allocate benefits 
and burdens among one other. Of the three, conservation easements likely will 
be the most successful in preventing the Ohio DOGRM from forcing a land-
owner’s land into a drilling unit or pool. However, to be effective, the conser-
vation easement must be carefully drafted.  
141.  Id.  
142.  Id.  
143. Earthworks’ Oil and Gas Accountability Project, Breaking All the Rules: The Crisis in Oil & 
Gas Regulatory  Enforcement,  at  14  (2012), https://earthworks.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/files/ 
publications/FINAL-US-enforcement-sm.pdf; see also  Kaoru  Suzuki, The Role  of  Nuisance  in  the 
Developing Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing , 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 265, 277 (2014). 
144.  Earthworks’ Oil and Gas Accountability Project,  supra note 143, at 89.  
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1. Servitudes 
The common law of servitudes provides landowners with opportunities to con-
trol  the  use  of  their  property  not only  in  the  present  but also  into  the  future. 
Although servitudes provide an effective means for allocating risks and external-
ities, they can also restrict the use and alienability of real property. For this rea- 
son,  courts  sometimes  disfavor  servitudes.145  Despite  this  disfavor,  when 
constructed clearly, courts honor servitudes and the landowner’s right to place  
restrictions upon his or her property by subsequent possessors.146 
Landowners might create or enforce servitudes to prevent the development of 
oil and gas operations, avoiding mandatory pooling and forced unitization. For 
example, landowners recently  sued  a drilling  company  and  neighboring land-
owners for violating a restrictive covenant covering all of the properties within  
the  community  association.147 In  the complaint,  the plaintiff,  Kempen,  argued 
that  neighboring parcels could  not  be  forced  into  the drilling  unit  because  the 
properties were subject to restrictive covenants prohibiting the land from being 
used for anything other than single-family residences and from any activity that 
would  constitute  a  nuisance. 148 Although  the  case  is currently  pending  on  
Kempen’s  motion  for  summary  judgment,149  it  presents  a  good  question  of 
whether landowners may use servitudes proactively to protect their land against a 
mandatory pooling or forced unitization order. 
2. Restrictive Covenants and Equitable Servitudes 
Restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes are private agreements entered 
into by a seller and a purchaser during the conveyance of a property interest. 150 
These agreements limit the permissible uses of the property. 151 Restrictive cove-
nants  and equitable  servitudes  are similar,  differing  most importantly  in  the  
145. Driscoll  v.  Austintown  Assoc.,  328  N.E.2d  395,  404  (Ohio  1975)  (quoting Loblaw,  Inc.  v. 
Warren Plaza Inc., 127 N.E.2d 754 (Ohio 1955)) (“Our legal system does not favor restrictions on the 
use of property . . . [and therefore,] ‘[t]he general rule . . . is that such agreements are strictly construed 
against limitations . . . and that all doubts should be resolved against a possible construction thereof 
which would increase the restriction upon the use of such real estate.’”).  
146.  See Marinelli v. Prete, No. E-09-022, 2010 WL 2025374, at  ¶ 33 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 2010). 
147.  Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Injunctive Relief, Damages and Attorney’s Fees,  
Kempen v. Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-13-807931, 2013 WL 2422687 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. May  
23, 2013).  
148.  Id.  
149. See generally Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, Damages and  
Attorneys’ Fees, Kempen v. Bass Energy, Inc., No. CV-13-807931 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. May 23,  
2013).  
150.  See Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Ohio 2002); see also Orwell Nat. Gas Co., Inc. v.  
Fredon Corp., 30 N.E.3d 977, 981–82 (Ohio 2015).  
151.  See id.  
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remedy sought for their breach.152 Restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes 
are effective in preventing efforts to pool a property voluntarily. 153 However, it is 
not yet clear that courts will honor such agreements against a mandatory pooling 
order issued by the state, such as Ohio’s DOGRM. This section will analyze the 
effectiveness of carefully constructed restrictive covenants in preventing volun-
tary inclusion of land in drilling units. It will then describe the potential difficul-
ties  in  their  use  to  prevent involuntary inclusion  and  argue  that  the  intent  to 
prohibit drilling  must  be explicit  for  a  court  to  enforce  a land  use  restriction 
against drilling. 
a. Effective Use of Restrictive Covenants and Equitable Servitudes in Preventing 
Mandatory Pooling 
Although it mistakenly referred to the agreement as a restrictive covenant, an 
Ohio court held that an equitable servitude is an effective tool in preventing vol-
untary pooling efforts between drilling companies and private citizens. 154 The use 
of an equitable servitude for this purpose is not unlimited, however. Courts tradi-
tionally disfavor restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes because they can 
limit the alienability of property. As a result, courts narrowly interpret the cove-
nant or servitude to reduce its limiting power. Therefore, if a restrictive agree-
ment is to be effective as a preventative measure against the voluntary pooling of 
land for oil and gas operations, it must be drafted in a targeted way and use clear, 
restrictive language.  
In Devendorf  v.  Akbar Petroleum  Corporation ,  David  and  Joan  Devendorf 
sought a court order enjoining several neighbors and Akbar Petroleum, an oil and 
gas drilling  company,  from voluntarily  forming  a drilling  unit. 155 The land  on 
which  Akbar Petroleum planned  to drill  was  not  subject  to  use  restrictions. 156  
Rather, the surrounding properties, which were necessary to satisfy state mini-
mum acreage requirements, were subject to the restrictions of an equitable servi- 
tude.157 The agreement explicitly stated that the surrounding lands could only be 
used “for private residence and agricultural purposes and that no commercial or 
industrial  business shall  be  conducted  thereon.” 158 Akbar Petroleum,  and  the 
neighbors  who  wished  to  unitize  the  dissenter’s land,  argued  that  the  “mere  
152.  See id.; see also  City of Perrysburg v. Koenig, No. WD-95-011, 1995 WL 803592, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1995) (“The only difference in the elements necessary to form an equitable servitude 
from those required to form a covenant running with the land is that an equitable servitude requires no 
horizontal privity.”).  
153.  See Devendorf v. Akbar Petroleum Corp., 577 N.E.2d 707, 708–10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).  
154.  Id.  at  710 (explaining  that  because  the  remedy  sought  was equitable—an  injunction—rather 
than monetary, the plaintiffs were seeking to enforce the agreement as an equitable servitude not as a  
restrictive covenant).  
155.  Id. at 708.  
156.  Id.  
157.  Id.  
158.  Id.  
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unitization  of  said  property  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  the  minimum  acreage 
requirement is not a violation of any restrictive covenant” when no drilling opera-
tions would occur on the land subject to the restriction. 159 However, the court dis-
agreed  and held  that  the equitable  servitude  prohibited  the landowners  from 
voluntarily forming a drilling unit. 160 The court held that “[t]he language of the 
restriction is broad and is intended to exclude every use not pertaining to residen-
tial purposes.” 161 This interpretation allowed the court to expand the meaning of 
“commercial use” to properties where no drilling activities were occurring, but  
where the owners were profiting from the operation as a unit. 
Conversely, in a subsequent Ohio case, Ormbsy v. Transcontinental Oil and  
Gas  Corporation,  the  Ninth  District  Court  of Appeals  denied  the plaintiff’s 
request for an injunction to prevent her neighbors from entering into an oil and 
gas lease. 162 Upon review of the equitable servitude, both the trial and appellate 
courts found that the agreement did not prevent the use of the land for oil and gas 
purposes. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court focused on the language 
of the agreement, which stated “[t]he land is to be used primarily for residential  
and  farming  purposes.”163 The  court  distinguished  this  from language  used  in 
other equitable servitudes, which used “only” or “solely” instead of “primarily,” 
and held that the servitude would not be violated so long as the oil and gas opera-
tions were incidental to the property’s primary use, which must remain residential 
or agricultural. 164 
Landowners may deploy private land use restrictions, like restrictive covenants 
and equitable servitudes, to prevent neighbors from voluntarily including land in 
a drilling unit. To be effective, however, the restrictive agreements must be care-
fully drafted, stating an explicit intent to prevent not only oil and gas production 
on the surface of the restricted parcel but also its inclusion in a drilling unit. 
b. Likely Ineffective Use of Real Covenants or Equitable Servitudes in 
Preventing a Mandatory Pooling Order 
While restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes may be effective tools for 
preventing neighboring landowners from voluntarily joining oil and gas develop-
ment units, they are likely not effective for preventing an order for mandatory 
pooling or forced unitization. Ohio courts have held restrictive covenants invalid 
when they conflict with public policy. 165 Ohio courts have explained that a re-
strictive  covenant  is  contrary  to public policy  when  it violates  a  statute;  is  
159.  Id. at 709.  
160.  Id.  
161.  Id. at 710. 
162.  Ormsby v. Transcon. Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 18063, 1997 WL 600619, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.  
17, 1997).  
163.  Id. at *2–3 (emphasis added).  
164.  Id.  
165.  Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887, 889 (Ohio 1929).  
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contrary to a judicial decision; is against the public health, morals, safety, or wel-
fare; or is in some way injurious to the public good. 166 A court may view a restric-
tive covenant that prevents a landowner from developing oil and gas interests as 
in conflict with the policy of the State of Ohio, which is to protect the correlative 
rights of landowners who wish to develop their oil and gas interests. 167 In general, 
Chapter 1509 of the Ohio Revised Code supports this policy. 168 The Chapter was 
enacted in 1965 with the purpose of striking a balance between “further[ing] the 
public’s interest in conservation and to protect the property rights of operators 
and landowners.” 169 The resulting legislation allowing  the  DOGRM  Chief  to 
issue orders for mandatory pooling and forced unitization of land for drilling pur-
poses furthers Ohio’s policy of providing “effective development, use, and con-
servation of oil and gas.” 170 Because it appears to be Ohio’s policy to ensure the 
effective use and development  of oil and gas deposits throughout the state, an 
Ohio court would likely invalidate a restrictive covenant attempting to limit such 
development.  
3. Conservation Easements 
This section will consider the use of conservation easements to protect a dis-
senting landowner’s land  from  becoming  subject  to  a  mandatory pooling  or 
forced unitization order. A conservation easement is a contractual agreement in 
which a landowner “grants an enforceable, nonpossessory property interest to the 
easement holder,” which is usually a conservation organization. 171 The easement 
holder receives the right to enforce prohibitions against future development on  
the property.172 
Today, in Ohio, there are an estimated 46,000 acres of land protected by some  
form of a conservation easement.173 The question here is whether a landowner  
166.  Id. (holding that the restrictive covenant, which reserved for Van Sweringen the right to re-enter 
the property for the purpose of developing public improvements, did not violate public policy because 
the terms of the covenant were consistent with the statutory code governing public improvements).  
167.  See Laura Johnston, Ohio Laws Governing Gas Drilling Among Most Lenient in Nation, Experts  
Say,  CLEV.  PLAIN  DEALER (July  05,  2009), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/07/ohio_laws_ 
governing_gas_drilli.html. 
168.  Baker,  supra  note  11,  at  222; see also  OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN.  §  1509.27  (LexisNexis  2018) 
(stating that “the chief, if satisfied . . . that mandatory pooling is necessary to protect correlative rights 
and to provide effective development, use, and conservation of oil and gas, shall issue a drilling permit 
and a mandatory pooling order complying with the requirements for drilling a well”).  
169.  Baker, supra note 11, at 221 (quoting J. Richard Emens & John S. Lowe, Ohio Oil and Gas  
Conservation Law-The First Ten Years (1965-1975), 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 31–32 (1976)).  
170.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27. 
171. Nicholas R. House, Conflicting Property Rights Between Conservation Easements and Oil and 
Gas Leases in Ohio: Why Current Law Could Benefit Conservation Efforts , 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.  
1587,  1592  (2014); see also James  Boyd  et al.,  The  Law  and  Economics  of  Habitat  Conservation: 
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions , 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 212 (2000).  
172.  House, supra note 171, at 1591–92.  
173.  State  of  Ohio  and All  Easements ,  NAT’L  CONSERVATION  EASEMENT  DATABASE,  http://  
conservationeasement.us/reports/easements (last visited Apr. 24, 2015) (data on file with author). This 
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can use a conservation easement to protect land against drilling in general and, in 
particular, against government ordered inclusion in a drilling unit. One piece of 
this question is whether a government-ordered inclusion in a drilling unit termi-
nates the applicability of a conservation easement. 
a. Limitations to the Use of a Conservation Easement: The Problem of the Split  
Estate 
Whether a landowner may employ a conservation easement to prevent hori-
zontal drilling largely depends on whether the property is a split estate. A split 
estate exists when a property’s mineral estate 174  is severed, or divided from the 
surface estate, and the surface and mineral estates are owned by different par- 
ties.175 Horizontal drilling should  not  occur  when  a  conservation  easement  is 
placed on a property with an un-severed mineral estate or a mineral estate owned  
in fee interest176 because the conservation easement encumbers the entire fee, sur-
face and mineral estates alike. In contrast, placing a conservation easement on a 
split estate does not guarantee that horizontal drilling will not occur because nei-
ther the surface estate owner nor the easement holder can control the subsurface 
mineral estate’s fate. 177  
Split estates are problematic for creating effective conservation easements for 
several reasons. First, the mineral estate owner is not a party to the easement and 
is therefore not bound by its terms. Furthermore, Ohio’s common law favors de-
velopment of the mineral estate, the dominant estate, over development of the  
surface estate, the servient estate.178 Thus, the mineral estate owner may choose 
figure excludes the estimated 62,373 acres of farmland subject to agricultural easements. This paper, 
however, does not focus on agricultural easements which are treated differently under Ohio law. 
174. Mineral rights may be conveyed apart from the surface rights and may separately be the subject 
of ownership and disposition. Each attribute of a mineral estate is an independent property right, may be 
severed into a separate interest, and may be separately conveyed or reserved by the owner. When the 
mineral and surface estates are severed, the mineral estate is the dominant estate and the surface owner  
possesses  the  subservient  estate  absent  express  provisions  to  the  contrary.  MATTHEW  W.  WARNOCK, 
Ownership of Mineral Rights , BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. REAL EST. § 47:1 (West Dec. 2017).  
175.  KENDOR P. JONES ET AL., LANDMAN’S LEGAL HANDBOOK 181–82 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Found.,  
5th ed. 2013).  
176.  House, supra note 171, at 1603–04 (observing that once a conservation easement is placed on a 
property with an unsevered mineral estate, “the conservation organization will know that oil and gas 
development will not occur on the property” unless the easement is violated).  
177.  Cf. Ross H. Pifer, The Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Rush: The Impact of Drilling on Surface  
Owner  Rights,  AGRIC.  LAW  RES.  &  REFERENCE  CTR.  2  (Jan.  18,  2011), https://pennstatelaw.psu. 
edu/_file/aglaw/Natural_Gas/The_Marcellus_Shale_Natural_Gas_Rush-The_Impact_of_Drilling_on_  
Surface_Owner_Rights.pdf. 
178.  Snyder v. Dep’t Nat. Res., 985 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Snyder v. 
Dep’t Nat. Res., 18 N.E.3d 416 (Ohio 2014) (stating that a mineral estate carries with it the right to use 
as much of the surface as may be “reasonably necessary to reach and remove the minerals”); see also  
House, supra note 171, at 1599 (explaining that Ohio favors the traditional rule that a mineral estate’s  
interests override the conflicting interests of the surface estate because the surface estate is servient to 
the dominant mineral estate).  
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to develop his mineral interests. 179 The surface and easement holders would be 
powerless  to  stop  the mineral  estate  owner  from  agreeing  to  an oil  and  gas 
lease.180 
Second, the mineral estate owner benefits from implied rights to the use of the 
surface, including the ability to access the surface as is “reasonably necessary for 
‘exploring, drilling, producing, transporting, and marketing’ the product.” 181 The 
mineral estate owner can even engage in activities that are harmful to the surface,  
“such as destroying crops, disposing of wastes, and using both surface and sub- 
surface water.”182 The mineral estate owner is only required to compensate the 
surface estate owner for unreasonable surface use, negligence, or breach of con- 
tract.183 As a result, the mineral estate owner “does not need permission from the 
surface owner to use the land surface for oil and gas development.” 184 Finally, the 
mineral estate owner retains these implied rights even if the surface estate is pro- 
tected by a conservation easement185  because a conservation easement “cannot 
bind a mineral owner who was not a party to the [agreement].” 186  This creates the 
potential  for  extensive natural  gas drilling  on  conserved  properties  when  the 
estates are split. 187 
Surface estate owners may be able to unite the split estate and then use conser-
vation easements to prevent horizontal drilling. Both the Ohio Dormant Minerals 
Act  and  the Marketable Title  Act  provide  mechanisms  for  unifying  a split  
estate.188 Additionally,  the  surface  and mineral  estate  owners could  reach  a  
179.  Id.  
180.  Cf. Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation Easements, 
and Drilling In The Marcellus Shale , 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 139 (2013).  
181.  Id. at 145 (internal citation omitted);  see Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 24 Ohio Cir. Dec. 106, 109  
(Ohio C.C. 1911) (stating that the conveyance of the surface reserved to the grantor a right of access to 
the estate below by an implied reservation . . .[; t]he conveyance . . . carried with it by an implied grant, 
if not in express terms, a right of access to such oil and gas); see also  House, supra note 171, at 1598.  
182.  Anderson, supra note 180, at 145.  
183.  Id. at 145–46.  
184.  JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 43 (Thompson West 2009). 
185. Michael T. Fulks, Drilling and Deductions: Making the Section 170(H) Conservation Easement 
Work in the Shale Boom Era , 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (2014) (“The subsurface owner’s right to 
drill reasonably is protected by state property law and cannot be restricted by a contract made between  
two other parties.”).  
186.  Anderson, supra note 180, at 139.  
187.  Cf. id.  
188.  See also  RICHARD  A.  YOSS,  DO  YOU  HAVE  SEVERED  OIL  AND  GAS  INTERESTS  ON  YOUR  
PROPERTY?  (2014)), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCanUse/Pages/Do-You- 
Have-Severed-Oil-and-Gas-Interests-on-Your-Property.aspx.  ODMA  is  a specialized  section  of  the 
Ohio Marketable Title Act, O HIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-56, which is explored in Part II.C.b.  See  
OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. § 5301.56(E)(1), (H), (B)(3) (LexisNexis 2018); see also  YOSS, supra note 188 
(“Several recent court decisions have held 0 0 0that it is sufficient to use only the original 1989 version of 
the  Dormant Minerals  Act,  which  does  not  require  the  giving  of  notice  if  there  is  a  20-year  period 
between  March  22,  1969  and  June  30,  2006  when  no  savings  event  has  occurred.  An example  of  a 
savings event would be the recording of a claim to preserve that interest or a title transaction, where that 
interest was the subject of that transaction.”); Pollock v. Mooney, 2014 WL 4976073, at *2 (Ohio Ct.  
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mutually beneficial agreement to unify the estates through negotiation and private 
law ordering. 189 Once the estate is unified, the conservation easement could be a 
viable tool for landowners to prevent drilling beneath their land. 
b. Whether a Conservation Easement Can Prevent Voluntary Oil and Gas 
Pooling or Unitization 
Ohio courts likely would hold that a conservation easement prohibiting mineral 
extraction below the surface can effectively prevent voluntary unitization or pool-
ing by the landowner. However, this tool likely would not protect the dissenting 
landowner  from  being compelled  into  a drilling  unit.  This  section will  first 
address  a  conservation  easement’s  effect  on potential voluntary inclusion  in  a 
drilling unit. 
Whether  an  estate  is split—with  the  surface  and  subsurface mineral  rights 
owned by different parties—or unified—with the surface and subsurface mineral 
rights owned by the same party—can have significant implications for the effec-
tiveness of a conservation easement in preventing oil and gas activity on or under 
the surface estate. However, for ease of analysis, the following sections assume 
the properties in question are unified estates. This assumption allows the discus-
sion to reach the root of the question: whether a conservation easement could pre-
vent voluntary  or compelled pooling  or  unitization.  Again,  the  purpose  of 
considering this possibility is to determine whether a dissenting landowner could 
use a conservation easement to prevent the land’s voluntary inclusion in a drilling  
unit. 
One commentator observed, “unlike Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the law 
of oil and gas in Ohio is largely undeveloped except for a few cases discussing 
the nature of the lessee’s interest in oil and gas leases and some discussion of 
implied covenants.” 190 Pennsylvania courts, however, have held that conservation 
easements can prohibit natural gas drilling and specifically, horizontal drilling. 191 
Pennsylvania and Ohio share similar conservation easement enabling statutes and 
App. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing Collins v. Moran, No. 02 CA 218, 2004 WL 549479, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.  
Mar. 17, 2004)).  
189.  House, supra note 171, at 1604; see Fulks, supra note 185, at 1062 (“An oil and gas company 
that purchases mineral rights with the express intent of developing them should be expected to assert its 
property interests to the full extent of state law.”); S COTT  HOWARD  & MATT  MCDONOUGH, MINERAL  
RIGHTS  AND  LAND  CONSERVATION  IN  THE  MIDWEST: ONLINE  TRAINING (Mar. 20, 2008) (on file with  
author); see also  Anderson, supra note 180, at 147 (“the accommodation doctrine, first articulated by the  
[Texas] Supreme Court in Getty Oil  [Co.] v. Jones[,] [470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971)] has made inroads 
into the traditional common law distribution of rights, which strongly favored the mineral owner, and 
has provided some additional protections for surface owners”).  
190.  George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus Shale  
States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 189 (2009).  
191.  See Ray v. W. Pa. Conservancy, No. 1799 WDA 2011, 2013 WL 11279650 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 
21,  2013);  Stockport  Mt.  Corp.  LLC  v.  Norcross Wildlife  Found.,  Inc.,  No.  3:11cv514,  2014  WL  
131604 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2014); see also infra  Part IV.  
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their  courts  have  interpreted  conservation  easements analogously. 192  Ohio  and 
Pennsylvania’s conservation easement statutes are substantially similar and based  
on the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”).193 In Ohio, conservation  
easements may be granted to the Ohio DNR, park districts, conservancy districts, 
soil and water conservation districts, water and sewer districts, counties, cities, 
townships, and municipal corporations. Pennsylvania’s enabling statute defines 
conservation easements similarly to Ohio’s and also allows governmental bodies 
and charitable organizations to hold conservation easements. This suggests that 
an Ohio court might rule favorably when faced with deciding whether a conserva-
tion easement may prohibit horizontal drilling beneath a landowner’s property. 
Pennsylvania’s enabling statute reads: “Any general rule of construction to the 
contrary notwithstanding, conservation or preservation easements shall be liber-
ally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the purposes of 
those easements and the policy and purpose of this act.” Ohio’s enabling statute 
lacks this explicit encouragement to courts to interpret conservation easements in 
favor of their proffered  purposes. Pennsylvania’s enabling statute states: “This 
act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uni-
form the laws with respect to the subject of this act among states enacting similar 
laws.” While  Ohio’s enabling  statute lacks  this  provision,  this  section  of 
Pennsylvania’s enabling statute suggests that Pennsylvania courts will look to the 
decisions of other UCEA-based states, including Ohio, when interpreting conser- 
vation easements.  
Despite  these  differences,  when  interpreting  conservation  easements, 
Pennsylvania  courts  adhere  to  the  same  interpretative model  that  Ohio  courts  
use.194  In Zagrans  v. Elek,  the  Ohio  Court  of Appeals  for  the  Ninth  District 
explained that “[w]hen an easement is set forth in a written agreement, it is sub-
ject to the rules of contract law.” 195 Similarly, in Ray v. Western Pennsylvania  
Conservancy, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania employed the same analysis as 
192.  Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009);  
Ray, 2013 WL 11279650.  
193.  See OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. §§ 5301.67–5301.70 (LexisNexis 2018); see also  32 PA. STAT. &  
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5051–5059 (West 2018). 
194.  The following  are  the only published  Ohio  cases  which  mention  conservation  easements  or 
Ohio’s conservation easement enabling statute, O HIO  REV. CODE  ANN. §§ 5301.67–70: Rzepka v. City 
of Solon, 904 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 2009) (addressing local elections); Wetland Pres. Ltd v. Corlett, 975 N. 
E.2d 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (addressing taxation and wetlands); Massasauga Rattlesnake Ranch,  
Inc. v. Hartford Twp. Bd., Nos. 2011–T–0060, 2001–T–0061, 2012 WL 1020293 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
26, 2012) (addressing zoning variances); Schabel v. Troyan, Nos. 2010–G–2953, 2010–G–2954, 2011  
WL 2112531 (Ohio Ct. App. May 20, 2011) (addressing zoning); Zagrans, 2009 WL 1743203; Lightle  
v. City of Washington Court House, No. CA2006-08-033, 2007 WL 1248171 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
2007)  (addressing wetlands);  Stickney  v. Tullis-Vermillion,  847  N.E.2d  29  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  2006) 
(addressing  property valuation  for  taxation  purposes);  HAP  Enters.  v.  Cuy.  Cty.  Bd.  of  Rev.,  Nos. 
58678,  58679,  1991  WL  95079  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  May  30,  1991)  (addressing  property valuation  for  
taxation purposes).  
195.  Zagrans, 2009 WL 1743203, at *3.  
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the Ohio court in Zagrans, explaining that “easement provisions are interpreted 
under the same rules of construction as contracts.” 196  Therefore, in both Ohio 
and Pennsylvania, courts will look to the language of a contract when attempting 
to determine the parties’ intent, and when the language of the contract is unam-
biguous, courts will enforce the express language of the contract. 197  
Ray  v.  Western Pennsylvania  Conservancy  and  Stockport  Mountain 
Corporation  LLC  v.  Norcross Wildlife  Foundation,  Inc.  further reveal  how 
Pennsylvania courts interpret conservation easements in the context of natural gas dril-
ling.198 These Pennsylvania decisions, combined with the similarity between Ohio 
and Pennsylvania  conservation  easement laws,  suggest  that  an  Ohio  court  may 
allow conservation easements to prevent voluntary pooling when faced with the 
issue of whether conservation easements can prohibit horizontal drilling.  
In Ray, the plaintiff sought to pool his land voluntarily into a horizontal drilling 
operation. However, his land, a unified estate, was encumbered by a conservation 
easement placed on the land by the prior owner. Ray argued the drilling operation 
would not violate the conservation easement because drilling would only occur 
horizontally underground and would not impact the surface of the land subject to  
the  conservation  easement.199 The  conservation  easement holder,  Western 
Pennsylvania  Conservancy  (“WPAC”),  disagreed,  arguing  that  the  easement’s 
language should  be  interpreted broadly  so  as  to  forbid all drilling  activities, 
including  subsurface horizontal drilling. 200 Ray  sought  a declaratory  judgment  
rejecting WPAC’s interpretation.201 
The trial court agreed with WPAC’s interpretation, which was affirmed by the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 202 The Superior Court focused less on the dril-
ling language of the easement and more on the easement’s prohibition on the re-
moval of any minerals, regardless of the means used. 203 The Superior Court held 
that the “restriction at issue” was “clear and unambiguous” and not limited to sur-
face drilling; “[r]ather, [the easement’s] restriction encompasses all removal of 
gas from the Real Estate.” 204 The effect of the Ray court’s decision is that a con-
servation easement prohibiting mineral extraction in general means that a well 
cannot be drilled—even horizontally, deep below the surface.  
196.  Ray, 2013 WL 11279650, at *3.  
197.  Compare Zagrans, 2009 WL 1743203 with id. at *2.  
198.  See Stockport  Mt.  Corp.  LLC  v.  Norcross Wildlife  Found.,  Inc.,  No.  3:11cv514,  2014  WL  
131604 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2014); Ray, 2013 WL 11279650, at *3.  
199.  Id.  
200.  Id. at *8.  
201.  Ray,  2013  WL  11279650,  at  *1  (Paragraph  2C  of  the  easement  prohibited  “quarrying, 
excavation, drilling or other removal of coal, clay, oil, gas  0 0 0 including but not limited to, extraction or 
removal of any such minerals by surface mining methods, from the Real Estate.”).  
202.  Id. at *1, 2.  
203.  Id. at *9.  
204.  Id.  
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Pennsylvania  courts  have held similarly  regarding  surface drilling.  In  
Stockport Mountain, a Pennsylvania court again held that a conservation ease-
ment prohibited surface natural gas drilling. 205 In this case, the driller sued for a 
declaratory judgment “that the conservation easement does not prohibit natural 
gas drilling.” 206 The driller argued that the original parties to the easement did not 
intend for it to prohibit natural gas drilling. 207  The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the easement prohibited surface 
natural gas drilling. 208 The court explained that Pennsylvania’s conservation ease-
ment enabling  statute  “instructs  courts  interpreting  conservation  easements  to 
construe  the  terms  of  those  easements liberally”  and  “in  favor  of  the  grants  
therein.”209 The court held that “the words constituting the conservation easement 
are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation  0 0 0 that surface natural gas 
drilling on the property is prohibited.” 210 
Pennsylvania decisions have held that, with sufficiently explicit language, con-
servation easements are effective tools to prevent subsurface oil and gas produc-
tion  through horizontal drilling  and  the  use  of  surface land  for oil  and  gas 
production.  Because  Ohio  and Pennsylvania  statutes  are similar,  a  dissenting 
landowner  in  Ohio  may  succeed  in  preventing oil  and  gas  production  on  or 
beneath the land by transferring to an eligible institution a conservation easement 
prohibiting oil and gas development on or beneath the land. 
c. Conservation Easements May Prevent Mandatory Pooling or Forced  
Unitization by the State 
Although it appears that a conservation easement may be an effective tool for  
preventing voluntary pooling, it is still unclear whether a conservation easement 
would protect land against a  mandatory pooling or forced unitization order by the 
state agency. This section’s goal is to determine whether a state mandatory pool-
ing or forced unitization order could terminate a conservation easement, thereby 
freeing the land from the restrictions therein.  
One way a conservation easement can be terminated is through the govern- 
ment’s  action  of  eminent  domain,  a  taking  under  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  
the U.S. Constitution.211 However, courts consistently have held that applica-
tions  of  mandatory pooling  and  forced  unitization  statutes  do  not  constitute  
205.  Stockport Mt. Corp. LLC v. Norcross Wildlife Found., Inc., No. 3:11cv514, 2014 WL 131604,  
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2014).  
206.  Id. at *21.  
207.  Id. at *24.  
208.  Id. at *27.  
209.  Id. at *30–31.  
210.  Id. at *31.  
211.  JANET  DIEHL  &  THOMAS  S.  BARRETT,  THE  CONSERVATION  EASEMENT  HANDBOOK  131  (The 
Land Trust Alliance 5th prtg. 1988);  see U.S. CONST., amend. V.  
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takings.212 Courts have even justified mandatory pooling and forced unitization 
statutes as supporting valid exercises of the state’s police power 213  in ensuring 
natural  resources  are  not  wasted. 214  Therefore,  a  state  may  restrict  a  property 
owner’s rights if it furthers the public’s interest in the efficient extraction of oil  
and gas.215 As a result, courts have not found that actions taken under mandatory 
pooling  and  forced  unitization  statutes  constitute regulatory  takings;  instead, 
courts  find  they merely place  a qualification  on  the landowner’s  property  
interest.216 
Following  this logic,  it  seems  a  mandatory pooling  order  may  not  have  the  
strength to terminate a conservation easement because it does not amount to a  
taking.217 However, a court’s refusal to disable a conservation easement solely on 
the ground that a mandatory pooling order is not a taking, and therefore is not  
strong enough to terminate the conservation easement, may frustrate the purpose 
of  the  court’s underlying policy.  When  faced  with  the  question  of  whether  an 
agency may use a mandatory pooling order to terminate a conservation easement,  
the court may find that it is a taking and is sufficiently strong to extinguish the  
conservation easement because finding otherwise runs contrary to other court’s 
previously stated positions that these orders do not amount to takings. However, 
there is no case law to support this hypothesis. It is equally plausible that the con-
servation easement has the strength to withstand a mandatory pooling or forced 
unitization order on its own. If so, it would be an effective tool for preventing the 
mandatory pooling or forced unitization of one’s land. 
If constructed appropriately, a conservation easement may proactively prevent 
the  DOGRM  Chief  from compelling  the pooling  or  unitization  of privately- 
owned land for oil and gas drilling. However, proper construction of the conser-
vation easement is critical; a landowner should draft the language to minimize, or 
eliminate, ambiguity regarding the status and manner of all oil and gas production 
and  ensure  the  surface  and mineral  estates  are  unified. 218 The language  of  the 
212.  Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 87–88 (Okla. 1938); Palmer Oil Corp. v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1003 (Okla. 1951); see also Michael Pappas, Note,  Energy Versus  
Property, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 473 (2014).  
213.  Pappas, supra note 212, at 473.  
214.  Id.  
215.  Id.  
216.  Id.  
217.  See id.  
218.  A  number  of federal  agencies hold  conservation  easements.  According  to  the National 
Conservation Easement Database, federal agencies hold 25,064 easements in the United States. In Ohio 
alone, federal  agencies hold  446  conservation  easements.  Most  of  these  are held  by  the  U.S. Natural 
Resources  Conservation  Service,  a  division  of  the  United  States  Department  of Agriculture,  under  the 
Wetlands  Reserve  Program.  However,  other federal  agencies hold  conservation  easements,  such  as  the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. National Park Service.  See NATIONAL CONSERVATION  EASEMENT  
DATABASE, http://www.conservationeasement.us/resources/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). Unfortunately, the 
Wetlands  Reserve  Program  is  no longer  active.  However,  the  U.S. Natural  Resources  Conservation 
Service  has  one  operating  conservation  easement  program;  the Healthy  Forests  Reserve  Program. 
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easement  must  reflect  the  grantor’s  intent  to  prevent  the development  of oil 
and gas resources  on or beneath the land because courts  prefer to defer to the 
unambiguous language of the instrument. 219 Additionally, ensuring that the sur-
face and mineral estates are unified will prevent any owner of the mineral estate  
from frustrating the purpose of the conservation easement by exercising his or her 
dominant right to develop the minerals below.  
C. DURING A MANDATORY POOLING OR FORCED UNITIZATION PROCESS 
This section addresses the options and opportunities available to a dissenting 
landowner during the pooling or unitization process. “During the pooling pro-
cess” refers to the period after an applicant has submitted a mandatory pooling 
or forced unitization application to the agency but before the agency has issued 
an order to include the dissenter’s land in a pool or unit. This section analyzes 
the ways in which the landowner may challenge the application or the resulting 
order.  More specifically,  it  assesses  the  dissenting landowner’s  rights  under 
Ohio’s regulatory process to challenge an applicant’s request for a mandatory 
pooling or forced unitization order. 
1. Challenging the Mandatory Pooling Order in Ohio 
The circumstances of the dissenting landowner during the period when his or 
her land is being forced into a drilling unit vary widely from state to state due to 
variations in each  state’s regulatory regime.  Therefore, this section  focuses  on 
Ohio’s regulatory system to illustrate the legal potential for the dissenting land-
owner during the period of time that his or her land is made subject to a manda-
tory pooling or forced unitization order from the state. 
There  are  two  ways  a  dissenting landowner  might challenge  the  mandatory 
pooling application under Section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code. First, the 
dissenting landowner could show that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions 
required  prior to filing an application. Second, the dissenting landowner could 
attack the merits of the application, arguing that the order would be inappropriate 
because the applicant failed to demonstrate that mandatory pooling is necessary 
to protect correlative rights and to provide the effective development, use, and 
conservation of oil and gas.   
However, a landowner’s property must meet a number of requirements before it will be accepted into 
the program, such as “enhance or measurably increase the recovery of threatened or endangered species, 
improve biological  diversity  or  increase  carbon  storage.”  See  NATURAL  RESOURCES  CONSERVATION  
SERVICE, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/easements/forests/?cid=  
nrcs143_008387 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
219.  Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009).  
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a. Failure to Satisfy the Conditions Required in An Application for a Mandatory 
Pooling Order 
Before an applicant may submit an application requesting a mandatory pooling 
order from Ohio’s DOGRM, the applicant must satisfy two conditions. First, the 
applicant must show that the “tract or tracts are of insufficient size or shape to 
meet  the  requirements  for drilling  a  proposed well  thereon  as  provided  in  §  
1509.24 or 1509.25 of the Revised Code.”220 Second, the applicant must show 
that he “has been unable to form a drilling unit under [a voluntary agreement], on 
a just and equitable basis.” 221 These conditions give the dissenting landowner two 
potential points to challenge when disputing whether the applicant has satisfied 
the required conditions. The  dissenting landowner could  argue  that the pooled 
tracts are already of a sufficient size or shape to meet the requirements of a dril-
ling unit, and therefore, their land does not need be pooled. 222 Additionally, the 
dissenting landowner could argue the applicant did not attempt to reach a volun-
tary agreement on a just and equitable basis. 223  
i. Sufficient Size or Shape 
One important reason dissenting landowners find themselves in the position of 
having their land forced into drilling units against their wishes is that the state has 
placed size and shape requirements on drilling units. To apply successfully for a 
mandatory pooling order under Section 1509.27, the applicant’s compiled tract 
must  be  of  an  insufficient  size  or  shape  to allow  for drilling,  as  provided  by  
Sections 1509.24 or 1509.25.224 
The dissenting landowner must look to Sections 1509.24 and 1509.25 to argue 
that the applicant’s tract is already of a sufficient size to satisfy the drilling unit 
requirements  such  that  the  Chief should  deny  the application. 225  A  dissenting  
220.  Id.  
221.  Id.  
222.  Id.  
223.  Id.; see also Johnson  v. Kell,  626  N.E.2d  1002,  1004  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  1993)  (finding  that 
applicant had not adequately attempted to reach a voluntary agreement with the dissenting landowner on 
a “just and equitable basis”).  
224.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27. 
225.  Section 1509.24 vests the DOGRM Chief with the authority, upon the approval of the Technical 
Advisory Council  (“TAC”),  to  “adopt,  amend,  or  rescind rules relative  to  minimum  acreage 
requirements for drilling units and minimum distances from which a new well may be drilled . . . from 
boundaries of tracts, drilling units, and other wells.” From this authority, the Chief promulgated Ohio 
Administrative Code 1501:9-01-04, which establishes drilling unit and spacing rules. The size of the 
drilling unit depends on the depth of the planned oil and gas well. Section 1509.25, on the other hand, 
vests the Chief with the power to adopt special drilling unit requirements for a particular pool, which 
may vary from the requirements established under Section 1509.24. For the Chief to adopt a special 
drilling unit under Section 1509.25, the Chief, with the written approval of the TAC, must find that “the 
pool can be defined with reasonable certainty, that the pool is in the initial state of development, and that 
the establishment of such different requirements . . . is reasonably necessary to protect correlative rights 
or to provide effective development, use, or conservation of oil and gas.” Note: There is no evidence that  
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landowner might alternatively argue that, although the applicant’s tract is of an 
insufficient  size to meet  the drilling unit  requirements,  the  Chief should adopt 
special drilling unit requirements so the applicant does not need to pool the dis-
senting landowner’s land. To persuade the DOGRM Chief to adopt special unit 
requirements, the dissenting landowner must prove: (1) the pool can be defined 
with reasonable certainty, (2) the pool is in the initial state of development, and 
(3) the establishment of the special drilling unit requirements are reasonably nec-
essary to protect correlative rights or to provide effective development, use, or 
conservation of oil and gas. 226 
A  dissenting landowner  arguing  that  the  Chief should  adopt special drilling 
unit requirements rather than granting a mandatory pooling order must not only 
convince the Chief that this is a preferable course of action but must also persuade 
the Technical Advisory Council (“TAC”). 227 This could be a significant barrier to 
the dissenting landowner’s battle to defend his or her land. There is no evidence 
that this path has been taken by a dissenting landowner. As mentioned above, to 
convince  the  Chief  and  the  TAC  that  they should  create special drilling  unit 
requirements and deny the pooling application requires that the dissenting land-
owner prove the three required elements for establishing a special drilling unit. 
The first two, (1) the pool can be defined with reasonable certainty and (2) the 
pool is in the initial state of development, require that the dissenter have informa-
tion that likely only the oil and gas developer can access. The third, that the estab-
lishment of special drilling unit requirements are reasonably necessary to protect 
correlative rights or to provide effective development, use, or conservation of oil 
and gas places an extraordinary burden of proof on the dissenter. This effectively 
asks  the  dissenter  to  argue  in  support  of drilling  rights  for  neighboring 
landowners. 
It is unclear how the dissenter would ever prove that the compelled pooling 
would not protect the correlative rights of those impacted or provide for effective 
development, use, and conservation of oil and gas and that the Chief and TAC 
should employ a special drilling unit instead. 
ii. Applicant Did Not Attempt to Reach a Voluntary Agreement with the 
Dissenting Landowner on a Just and Equitable Basis 
The  second  condition  required  for applying  for  a  mandatory pooling  order 
requires the applicant to have attempted to reach a voluntary agreement with the 
dissenting landowner on a just and equitable basis. 228  When assessing whether 
a dissenting landowner has ever argued that the mandatory pooling order is unnecessary because the 
applicant’s  tract  is already  of  a  sufficient  size  to  meet  the drilling  unit  requirements  under  Section 
1509.24. If the compiled land was already of sufficient size and shape, the applicant would not have 
gone through the time and costs of requesting a mandatory pooling order.  
226.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.25 (LexisNexis 2018).  
227.  Id.  
228.  § 1509.27.  
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the applicant attempted to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement on a just and 
equitable basis, the court must find that the applicant extended a reasonable offer 
to the dissenting landowner and gave the dissenting landowner the opportunity to  
do the same.229  
In Johnson v. Kell, the court found that the mandatory pooling order applicant, 
Kleese, had not attempted to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement with the 
dissenting landowner,  Johnson,  on  a  just  and equitable  basis  because Kleese’s 
offers were unreasonable. 230 Johnson owned a thirteen-acre parcel of land with an 
existing well. 231 Johnson had purchased this land for the purpose of developing 
his oil and gas rights. 232 Kleese, interested in drilling a well of his own, needed to 
pool 1.4 acres of Johnson’s land to establish a drilling unit of sufficient size and 
shape under Ohio law. 233 Kleese extended only two offers to pool Johnson’s land 
before applying for a mandatory pooling order. 234 Additionally, Kleese’s offers 
sought to pool only the 1.4 acres necessary to complete his own drilling unit. 235 
If either of the offers had been accepted, it would have had several adverse 
impacts on Johnson. First, it would have significantly limited Johnson’s royalty 
interest  in Kleese’s well. 236  Second,  underground  pressure  and  flow  from 
Kleese’s new well would have effected Johnson’s existing well, making it less  
productive.237 Third, pooling Johnson’s 1.4 acres would have restricted Johnson 
from using his remaining 11.6 acres for future oil and gas development because 
Johnson would have trouble satisfying the size and shape requirements of a sepa-
rate drilling unit under Ohio law. 238 The Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review (the 
“Oil and Gas Board”) found Kleese’s offers unreasonable because they did not 
adequately address Johnson’s interests and frustrated the very purpose for which 
Johnson had purchased the land. 239 The appellate court affirmed the reasoning of 
the Oil and Gas  Board, holding  that Kleese  had not  offered to pool Johnson’s 
land on a just and equitable basis. The court reversed and remanded the judgment 
of the trial court. 240 
Similarly, in Simmers v. City of North Royalton, the court agreed with the Oil 
and Gas Board that Cutter Oil, the applicant for a mandatory pooling order, had 
not used all reasonable efforts to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement. 241  The  
229.  See Simmers v. City of N. Royalton, 65 N.E.3d 257, at  ¶ 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); see also 
Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).  
230.  Johnson, 626 N.E.2d at 1005.  
231.  Id. at 1003.  
232.  Id. at 1004.  
233.  Id.  
234.  Id.  
235.  Id.  
236.  Id.  
237.  Id.  
238.  Id. at 1005.  
239.  Id. at 1004.  
240.  Id. at 1005. 
241.  Simmers v. City of N. Royalton, 65 N.E.3d 257, at  ¶ 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).  
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court explained that “[t]he meaning of a ‘just and equitable basis’ was . . . whether 
such owner-applicant  has  used all reasonable  efforts  to  enter  into  a voluntary 
pooling agreement.” 242 Further, “‘all reasonable efforts’ contemplates both a rea-
sonable offer and sufficient efforts to advise the other owner or owners of the  
same.”243 The court found that Cutter Oil had applied for a mandatory pooling 
order before the city had had sufficient opportunity to complete its deliberations, 
consider the offer, and propose a reasonable alternative. Therefore, Cutter Oil did 
not use all reasonable efforts to reach a voluntary pooling agreement. 244  
Johnson and Simmers show that a party cannot apply for a mandatory pooling 
order without first making a good faith effort to reach a voluntary agreement with 
the  dissenting landowner. Additionally,  the applicant must give the landowner 
the opportunity to consider the offer carefully. This condition provides the dis-
senting landowner with an opportunity to challenge the validity of the application 
without having to dispute the merits of the application for mandatory pooling.  
Both Johnson and Simmers provide examples in which the dissenting landowner 
overcame a mandatory pooling order on the grounds that the Chief should not 
have rendered a decision on the application because the applicant was not eligible 
for an order when it failed to seek the voluntary pooling of the land on a just and 
equitable basis. 
b. Challenging a Mandatory Pooling Order on its Merits 
If the applicant has satisfied the two conditions for seeking a mandatory pool-
ing order, the dissenting landowner’s next option is to confront the application on 
its merits. To make a successful case for a mandatory pooling order, the applicant 
must prove that “mandatory pooling is necessary to protect correlative rights and 
to  provide  effective development,  use,  and  conservation  of oil  and  gas.” 245 
Therefore, if the dissenting landowner can demonstrate that the mandatory pool-
ing order would not protect correlative rights or provide for effective develop-
ment, use, and conservation of oil and gas, then the DOGRM Chief must deny the 
application for mandatory pooling. 246 
However, the practical reality is that it is extremely difficult for the dissenting 
landowner to obtain the information necessary to prove his or her case against the 
mandatory pooling order. Furthermore, the driller has many advantages through-
out the process, including favorable standards of review and access to informa-
tion and evidence that is often held internally by the drilling company.  
242.  Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting Jerry Moore, Inc. v. State of Ohio, Ohio Oil & Gas Bd. of Rev., Appeal No. 
1 (July 1, 1966)).  
243.  Id.  
244.  Id.  
245.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27.  
246.  Id.  
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Correlative  rights  are  “the reasonable  opportunity  to  every  person entitled 
thereto to recover and receive the oil and gas in and under his tract or tracts, or 
the equivalent thereof, without having to drill unnecessary wells or incur other  
unnecessary expense.”247 Courts have taken a broad interpretation of the concept 
of correlative rights, holding that it includes not only the “reasonable opportunity 
to recover the oil and gas under [the] land,” but also the reasonable opportunity to 
protect the landowner’s greater interest in his or her property. 248  
In Johnson, the court upheld this broad interpretation, holding that the order 
for  mandatory pooling  did  not  protect correlative  rights  because pooling  
Johnson’s 1.4 acres frustrated Johnson’s very purpose for purchasing the thirteen- 
acre tract: his ability to develop the oil and gas resources beneath it. 249 Kleese 
argued that Johnson’s “correlative rights [were] satisfied by virtue of the fact that 
he would be compensated with royalty payments at the standard industry rate.” 250  
However, the court disagreed.251  Johnson had purchased the thirteen acres at a 
premium in anticipation of developing his oil and gas rights. 252 The forced pool-
ing of Johnson’s 1.4 acres would severely restrict the development of his remain-
ing 11.6 acres, while only compensating him with royalties associated with the  
1.4 acres.253 Therefore, although Johnson’s particular interest in this case was to 
develop the oil and gas under his land, the court focused on a much broader prin-
ciple, which is that the correlative rights of a landowner include not only the land-
owner’s right to develop his or her oil and gas interests, but also the landowner’s 
reasonable interest in utilizing his or her property as intended. 254  The  Johnson 
court explained that “[t]he chief must find that mandatory pooling is necessary to 
protect every participating landowner’s correlative rights . . . [and] [t]he impact 
on  the unwilling  participant  who would  be  forced  to pool  must  be  taken  into  
account.”255  
The Simmers court followed the  Johnson court’s interpretation of correlative 
rights, emphasizing that “Johnson stands for the proposition that the impact of oil 
and  gas development  must  be  considered  against  the  backdrop  of  surrounding 
property[,]  even land  not directly  forced  into  the  mandatory pool.” 256  The  
Simmers court found that the mandatory pooling order did not protect correlative 
rights  because  North Royalton  had legitimate  safety  concerns  regarding  the  
247.  Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).  
248. See generally Simmers , 65 N.E.3d at ¶ 53–56; see also Johnson , 626 N.E.2d at 1005.  
249.  Johnson, 626 N.E.2d at 1005.  
250.  Id.  
251.  Id.   
252.  Id.  
253.  Id.  
254.  Id.  
255.  Id. 
256.  Simmers v. City of N. Royalton, 65 N.E.3d 257, at  ¶ 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).  
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impact of the drilling operation on the city’s surrounding property 257  that were 
not addressed by the mandatory pooling order. In doing so, the  Simmers court re-
inforced the proposition that correlative rights are more than just the landowner’s 
reasonable  opportunity  to  recover  the oil  and  gas  from  beneath  the  property. 
Rather, correlative rights include the landowner’s greater interests in their prop-
erty, and a mandatory pooling order is not warranted unless the order can accom-
modate  the  dissenting landowner’s  greater  interest  in  their land,  whether 
grounded in financial gain or safety.  
D. THE LANDOWNER’S ROLE FOLLOWING FORCED POOLING OR UNITIZATION 
During “post-pooling”—the period after the agency has ordered the dissenter’s 
land to be included in a pool or unit despite the landowner’s objections—options 
for redress range from traditional common law actions in tort for trespass and nui-
sance to constitutional challenges based on takings and due process rights. In the 
example of Ohio, challenging a mandatory pooling order that has already been 
issued by DOGRM is difficult for the dissenting landowner, in part because Ohio 
has effectively authorized the activity. 
However, at this stage, the landowner does have some options, although the 
law is less certain. In some jurisdictions, dissenting landowners have sued alleg-
ing trespass—stemming from the producer’s unwanted physical intrusion on the 
land—, nuisance—stemming from the drilling operations’ interference with the 
quiet  enjoyment  of landowners’  property—,  and  various constitutional chal-
lenges,  such  as  “takings  without  compensation”  and violations  of landowner’s  
due  process  rights.258 Although  other  states  have  varying constitutional  provi-
sions, common law interpretations, and regulatory mechanisms, Ohio case law is 
sparse in this area. Therefore, this section focuses on Ohio’s historical treatment 
of  common law  doctrines, coupled  with  other  states’  interpretation  of similar 
issues, to predict how Ohio courts will come out on a given issue.  
1. Statute-Based Means of Redress for the Dissenting Landowner 
This section discusses whether the dissenting landowner has any statute-based 
means of action under the mandatory pooling section of the Ohio Revised Code 
to challenge the DOGRM Chief’s mandatory pooling order to compel the land-
owner to participate in a drilling unit. Chapter 1509 of the Ohio Revised Code 
provides  dissenting landowners  with  an appeals  process  when  they  have  been  
257.  Simmers, 2016 WL 2866405; see also  Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Ohio Cities May Have a New 
Way to Control Oil and Gas Drilling Within Their Borders , CRAIN’S CLEVELAND (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:04 
AM), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20150911/BLOGS05/150919963/ohio-cities-may-have- 
a-new-way-to-control-oil-and-gas-drilling.  
258.  See,  e.g., Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.,  919 F. Supp. 2d 476 (M.D.  Pa. 2013) (nuisance);  
Berish  v.  Sw.  Energy  Prod.  Co.,  763  F.  Supp.  2d  702  (M.D.  Pa.  2010)  (nuisance);  Chance  v.  BP 
Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996) (trespass); Anderson v. Corp. Comm’n, 327 P.2d 699, 701 
(Okla. 1957) (taking).  
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adversely affected by a mandatory pooling order by the DOGRM Chief. Section  
1509.36  states  that “[a]ny  person adversely  affected  by  an  order  by  the  
[DOGRM]  Chief  0 0 0 may appeal to the Oil and Gas  Commission for an  order  
vacating or modifying the order.”259 Section 1509.37 further permits “[a]ny party 
adversely affected by an order of the Oil and Gas Commission [to] appeal to the 
Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.” 260  Therefore, Chapter 1509 pro-
vides two levels of appeal: the first level is an administrative appeal within the 
Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and the second is a judicial appeal to the 
Ohio  court  system.  Each  is  distinct  in  the  standard  of  review applied  and  
the degree of evidence required. 
a. Administrative Appeal 
The  dissenting landowner  may look  to  the  administrative  process  for relief 
when his or her property has become subject to a mandatory pooling order. This 
section evaluates the dissenter’s options under Ohio’s administrative process for 
mandatory pooling. 
When  a  party  has  been “adversely  affected”  by  a  mandatory pooling  order 
issued by the DOGRM Chief, the first means of redress is to appeal the order to 
the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission (“Commission”), 261  a five member commis- 
sion  appointed  by  the  governor.262 The  Commission recently held  that land-
owners whose land has been involuntarily added to a drilling unit are considered 
adversely  affected  by  the  order. 263  Under  Section  1509.36,  the  Commission’s 
standard of review is whether the DOGRM Chief’s order was lawful and reasona-
ble.264 The Chief has acted lawfully and reasonably when he finds that all the con-
ditions  to  securing  a  mandatory pooling  order  have  been  met  and  that  the 
evidence establishes that the mandatory pooling order is necessary to protect cor-
relative rights and provide for the effective development, use, and conservation 
of oil and gas. Upon completion of the hearing, if the Commission finds that the  
259.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36.  
260.  § 1509.37.  
261.  § 1509.36. 
262.  § 1509.35. The governor must appoint to the Commission one of each of the following: (1) a 
representative of the public, (2) a representative of independent petroleum operators, (3) a representative 
of a major petroleum company, (4) a representative who is learned and experienced in oil and gas law, 
and (5) a representative who is learned and experienced in geology or petroleum engineering.  See id.  
263.  See Order of the Commission Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Statutory Authority to Act, Wehr 
v. Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt., Appeal N. 912 (June 15, 2017) (holding that, although the landowner’s 
ability  to appeal  a  unitization  order  must  meet  the regulatory  requirements,  the  Ohio  Department  of 
Natural  Resources  is also  required  to  meet  its  duty  to timely  provide  notice  of  its  order  to  the 
landowner).  
264.  Id.; see also Simmers v. City of  N. Royalton, 65 N.E.3d 257, at  ¶ 25 (Ohio Ct.  App. 2016) 
(holding that “the chief had to determine if certain procedural formalities were met, whether mandatory 
pooling  was  necessary  to  protect correlative  rights  and  to  provide  effective development,  use,  and 
conservation of oil and gas . . . The commission [has] to determine whether the chief acted lawfully and 
reasonably in approving [the applicant’s] application for mandatory pooling.”).  
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order appealed  from  was lawful  and reasonable,  it will  affirm  the  Chief’s  
decision.265  
In  Johnson,  the  court  stated  that  “the  [Commission]  found  that  the  Chief’s 
order  was unlawful  and unreasonable  because Kleese  had  not established  a 
condition required prior to the filing of his application for mandatory pooling. 
Specifically, Kleese had not established that he tried to pool voluntarily on a 
just  and equitable  basis.” 266  The  Johnson  court  affirmed  the  Commission’s 
order, holding  “[t]he  [Commission],  therefore, properly  found  the  Chief’s 
order unlawful  and unreasonable  because  there  was  no valid factual  finding 
that  the  prerequisite  condition  was  met  or  that appellant’s correlative  rights 
would be protected.” 267  
In Simmers, the Commission found the Chief’s order unlawful and unreason-
able  because  “the  chief  acted unreasonably  in limiting  his  consideration  of 
whether Cutter Oil was unable to secure a voluntary lease with the city of North 
Royalton ‘on a just and equitable basis’ to the financial aspects of Cutter Oil’s 
offer to lease.” 268 In affirming the Commission’s view, the appellate court held 
that “it was reasonable for the commission to conclude that focusing solely on 
economic factors was too narrow of a view given the overall purposes of the man-
datory pooling statutes.” 269 
Additionally, the Commission may admit new evidence and make new factual  
determinations  by  conducting  de  novo  hearings.270 Section  1509.36 allows  for  
the Commission to hear witness testimony and review evidence such as books,  
records,  and  papers.271  In  Johnson,  the  court  stated  that  “the  board  is  given 
wide latitude in admitting new evidence and, therefore, in making new factual  
determinations.”272 In  exercising  its ability  to  make  new factual  findings,  the 
Commission was able to find that Kleese’s offers did not adequately compensate 
Johnson for offsetting his existing well and limiting Johnson’s ability to develop  
his remaining 11.6 acres.273  Then Simmers, relying on  Johnson,274 held that the 
Commission  was  warranted  in  considering  new  evidence  of  North Royalton’s 
safety concerns for the proposed well. 275 The Commission’s ability to admit new 
evidence during the administrative appeal is the principal characteristic that dis-
tinguishes  the  administrative appeal  from  the judicial appeal.  The  dissenting 
landowner should  take  some  comfort  in  the  power  of  this  body  to evaluate  
265.  § 1509.36. 
266.  Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).  
267.  Id. at 1006.  
268.  Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at ¶ 13–16.  
269.  Id. at ¶ 40.  
270.  Johnson, 626 N.E.2d at 1005.  
271.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36.  
272.  Johnson, 626 N.E.2d at 1005.  
273.  Id.  
274.  Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at ¶ 40.  
275.  Id.  
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mandatory pooling orders in the face of new evidence and to hold the DOGRM 
Chief accountable for following the rules set forth for mandatory pooling. 
b. Appealing to the County Court of Common Pleas 
In addition to the opportunity to challenge a mandatory pooling order in front 
of the Commission, a dissenting landowner has a second level of appeal before 
the Franklin  County  Court  of  Common Pleas  (“the  court  of  common pleas”). 
Chapter 1509 allows a party to appeal an adverse order from the Commission to 
this trial court. 276 
However, although Chapter 1509 provides a party with an appeal through the 
judicial system, the court’s review of the case is more restrictive than that of the 
Commission under section 1509.36. This is because the hearing of the appeal by  
the court is confined to the record as certified to it by the Commission.277 In fact, 
the court may only consider new evidence if “the additional evidence is newly 
discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior  
to the hearing before the commission.”278 Therefore, unlike the Commission, the 
court cannot review new evidence unless the party attempting to bring the evi-
dence can prove that it could not reasonably have been discovered earlier.  
In Simmers,  the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the court of common pleas, which held that it was proper for the Commission to 
consider North Royalton’s safety concerns when reviewing whether a mandatory 
pooling  order  was lawful  and reasonable. 279 The  court  of appeals  noted  that, 
although the Ohio Revised Code prohibits the court of common pleas from mak-
ing new factual findings, it does permit the Commission to make new findings, 
including considering North Royalton’s safety concerns, when reviewing a deci- 
sion by the DOGRM Chief.280  
In Johnson, the court of common pleas overturned the Commission’s ruling, 
finding it unlawful and unreasonable, and reinstated the DOGRM Chief’s manda-
tory pooling order. 281 The court of common pleas found the Commission’s order 
unlawful and unreasonable because “the chief’s order was supported by valid fac-
tual evidence that all of the statutory requirements for an R.C. 1509.27 mandatory 
pooling were met.” 282 Again, the court of common pleas was unable to make any 
new factual findings. It was permitted to review only the existing administrative 
record, where it found evidence to prove each element required for a mandatory 
pooling order. This differs from the review by the Commission, which was able  
276.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.37.  
277.  Id.  
278.  Id.  
279.  Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at ¶ 45.  
280.  Id. 
281.  Johnson v. Kell, 626 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).  
282.  Id.  
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to make new factual findings and uncover information about the damage being 
caused to Johnson’s existing well and remaining property. 
So, what does the manner and standard of review at each level of appeal under 
Chapter 1509 mean for the dissenting landowner? First, the Ohio Revised Code 
provides for a lengthy and multileveled means of appeal for a dissenting land-
owner that has been adversely affected by a mandatory pooling order. 283  Second, 
the dissenting landowner may introduce new evidence during the administrative 
appeals process. 284 This allows the dissenting landowner to continue to challenge 
the applicant’s  mandatory pooling application  on  its  merits.  Chapter  1509’s 
appeals process provides a mechanism for the dissenting landowner to continue 
to challenge an adverse order, including by arguing that the applicant failed to  
satisfy the conditions required for bringing an order, or the order does not protect 
correlative rights or provide effective development, use, and conservation of oil 
and gas. The limitation is that once the dissenting landowner reaches the judicial 
appeals process, he or she is limited to the evidence on the record, unless the land-
owner can show that the evidence was not discoverable through reasonable dili- 
gence prior to the hearing before the commission.285 
2. Common Law Means of Redress for the Dissenting Landowner Following 
a Mandatory Pooling or Forced Unitization Order 
Once a dissenting landowner has failed to prevent his or her land from falling 
subject  to  a  mandatory pooling  or  forced  unitization  order,  the  dissenter  may 
wish  to  seek  redress.  This  section  addresses  whether  a  dissenting landowner 
might find redress in the common law for harm that was caused when his or her 
land was included in a drilling unit against his or her will. In particular, this sec-
tion considers the potential for actions in trespass and nuisance.  
a. Trespass 
Landowners—dissenting  or  otherwise—who  hope  for  redress  in  tort law  to 
punish or compensate for subsurface invasion of their land will face a substantial 
obstacle. Although drilling activity on the surface is likely easy to prove, subsur-
face activity, such as horizontal drilling deep beneath the surface, presents a dif-
ferent circumstance; it is likely challenging to prove when and where the physical 
invasion necessary to prove a trespass claim occurred. 
In Ohio, as in most states, the elements of a traditional common law trespass 
claim are: possession by plaintiff at the time of the alleged trespass; unauthorized 
physical entry by defendant; and damage to the plaintiff which was the proximate   
283.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.36–1509.37.  
284.  § 1509.36.  
285.  § 1509.37.  
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result of the trespass. 286 With respect to drilling, a trespass may be fairly obvious 
with regard to a surface disruption; one could easily see an intruding surface well. 
However, a subsurface trespass would be considerably more difficult to show— 
particularly the occurrence of an unauthorized entry and that such entry caused 
damage.  It  might  be impossible  to  show,  for example,  that  invading  fracking 
injectate deep beneath the surface interfered with a landowner’s reasonable use  
of the surface. 
Prosser and Keeton refer to subsurface trespass as a “dog in the manger law” or 
a bad law and suggest that a remedy should only be available if there is damage 
to  the  surface  or  some  other  interference  with  a reasonable  use  of  the  subsur- 
face.287 Case law provides some indication as to how courts will treat subsurface 
invasions of land, but many questions remain unanswered. Currently, the leading 
case, heard by the Texas Supreme Court, sidestepped the trespass issue by hold-
ing that the rule of capture precludes a trespass where the only damage asserted is 
loss of hydrocarbons. 288 While the Ohio Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the 
issue of subsurface trespass and its relation to hydraulic fracturing specifically, it 
has confronted a similar subsurface trespass cause of action that may shed light  
on the issue.  
In Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., the plaintiff sued for both trespass and nui-
sance alleging  that chemical  waste  “injectate”  had laterally  migrated  from  a 
neighbor’s property to the plaintiff’s property beneath the surface. 289  The Ohio 
Supreme Court recognized ownership rights to the subsurface, explaining that a 
property owner’s subsurface rights include the right to exclude underground inva-
sions that actually interfere with one’s reasonable and foreseeable use of the sub- 
surface.290 However,  it also  found  that  to  be entitled  to  damages,  the plaintiff 
must  show  “some  type  of physical  damages or  interference  with  the  use”  that 
proximately resulted from the leakage of the injectate wells. 291 The court rejected 
the landowner’s trespass claim because the “evidence of trespass was simply too 
speculative.”292 In  so concluding,  the  court  stated  that  scientific  uncertainty 
regarding the precise location of the leaked injectate, coupled with the unusual 
and novel nature of the alleged invasion of property, prevented the plaintiff from 
succeeding  on  a  subsurface  trespass claim. 293  Thus,  in  Chance,  the  Ohio   
286. See also Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ohio 1996); see generally Kohl v.  
Hannaford, 1875 WL 5430, at *3 (Ohio Super. Ct. Oct. 1875).  
287.  W.  PAGE  KEETON  ET  AL.,  PROSSER  AND  KEETON  ON  TORTS  82  (5th  ed.,  West  Group  1984) 
(stating that because the surface owner had no practical access to the caves, either now or in the future, 
the decision is “dog-in-the-manger law, and can only be characterized as a very bad one”). 
288. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex. 2008).  
289.  Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 985.  
290.  Id.  
291.  Id. at 993.  
292.  Id.  
293.  Id.  
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Supreme Court endorsed the “reasonable use of the subsurface” requirement. 294 
Scientific uncertainty in determining “physical intrusions” or “actual damages” 
may present the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs alleging subsurface trespass in Ohio. 
Absent  surface  disruption, landowners alleging  subsurface  trespass will  find  it 
difficult to prove when and where the necessary physical invasion occurred and 
with which reasonable use the injectate interfered. 295 
Given Ohio’s scarcity of case law concerning hydraulic fracturing, it may help 
to look to the state’s Appalachian neighbors to see how they have confronted sim-
ilar issues. In Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC ., the U.S. District Court for  
the Northern District of  West Virginia considered  whether  a trespass  occurred 
when the defendant, Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, engaged in hydraulic fractur-
ing (via a horizontal well-bore) under the plaintiffs’ land in violation of a lease  
agreement.296 The plaintiffs owned property that encompassed a 217.77 acre tract 
of land. 297 In 2001, one plaintiff, Stone, was the sole owner of the entire tract. 298 
Stone  executed  a  five-year mineral  rights lease  with Phillips  Production  
Company.299 However, before the expiration of the five-year lease, Stone agreed 
to a five-year extension. Phillips Production Company assigned its rights under 
the lease to Chesapeake Appalachia. 300 The lease included a unitization provision 
purporting to grant the right to pool and unitize certain shale formations to join 
the adjacent lands with other leases or estates to facilitate production. 301  In partic-
ular, the provision applied this unitization right to the Onondaga and Oriskany 
shale  formations,  and  any  formations  that lie  beneath  them. 302  Because  the 
Marcellus formation lies above, not beneath, these specified formations, the court 
confirmed  that  the  unitization  provision  did  not apply  to Marcellus shale 
development.303 
In 2010, Chesapeake unsuccessfully attempted to modify the unitization provi-
sion to include the Marcellus shale formation. 304  Stone did not agree to the pro- 
posed modification.305 Chesapeake drilled a vertical well on neighboring property   
294.  Id. at 992.  
295. See also  Baker v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Nos. 11-4369, 12-3995, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16219, 
at *41 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2013) (holding that plaintiffs, who alleged subsurface trespass when oil spills 
and leaks produced a hydrocarbon plume under several properties, failed to demonstrate that the plume  
interfered with their use of the subsurface). 
296.  Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397, at *1 (N.D.W.  
Va. Apr. 10, 2013), vacated, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D.W. Va. July 30, 2013).  
297.  Id.  
298.  Id.  
299.  Id.  
300.  Id.  
301.  Id.  
302.  Id.  
303.  Id.  
304.  Id.  
305.  Id.  
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approximately 200 feet from the property line with the plaintiffs. 306 The horizon-
tal  aspect  of  the well-bore  extended  to  “within  tens  of  feet  from  the  property 
line,” but evidence suggested that hydrocarbons migrated to the well from under 
the plaintiff’s  property. 307 Therefore,  the well  extracted oil  and  gas  from  the 
Marcellus shale  formation located  beneath  the plaintiff’s  property  without  her  
permission.308 Stone filed suit, claiming that a trespass occurred through hydrau-
lic fracturing beneath her property; defendant Chesapeake argued that the tres-
pass claim was barred by the rule of capture. 309  
The Stone court first addressed whether the rule of capture applies to oil and 
gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing when the oil or gas is being drawn from 
beneath a neighbor’s land. 310 Before its analysis, the court emphasized the funda-
mental utility of hydraulic fracturing: to make possible the extraction of oil and  
gas that is trapped in tiny reservoirs within the rock.311 This trapped oil and gas 
does not flow freely, like the oil and gas to which the rule of capture was origi-
nally applied. 312 When  combined  with horizontal drilling, hydraulic  fracturing 
makes it possible to extract oil and gas that was previously unattainable. 313 Stone 
contended that West Virginia law does not recognize the  common law rule of 
capture as governing property rights to underground resources, such as oil and 
gas, when they are extracted through the use of hydraulic fracturing. 314 
Conversely, Chesapeake primarily relied on two cases to demonstrate that the 
rule of capture was alive and well in West Virginia, even with respect to oil and 
gas derived from hydraulic fracturing, and that its application barred a trespass 
claim.315  First, in Trent v. Energy Development Corporation, a federal appeals 
court held that “the law of capture allows a landowner to use artificial means of 
stimulating production even though the effect is to increase the drainage from the 
land  of  another.” 316  The  Trent court  recognized  that hydraulic  fracturing  pre-
sented a unique problem because extraction requires an unnatural enhancement 
of the flow of gas by increasing “the strata’s permeability and, as a consequence, 
the flow of gas into the well.” 317  However, the majority in Trent sidestepped the 
issue  by  stating  that,  within  the rule  of  capture,  a landowner  can  use artificial 
means to stimulate production even though these artificial actions will increase 
the flow of the resource from beneath one party’s land to its production through a  
306.  Id.  
307.  Id.  
308.  Cf. id.  
309.  Id. at *2.  
310.  Id. at *2–8.  
311.  Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted).  
312.  Cf. id.  
313.  Id.  
314.  Cf. id. at *2.  
315.  Id.  
316.  Trent v. Energy Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 1143, 1147 n. 8 (4th Cir. 1990).  
317.  Id.  
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well on another party’s land. 318 Although the court neglected to provide a defini-
tive standard, hydraulic fracturing seems to be a qualifying “artificial means of 
stimulating  production.”  Thus,  without explicitly  stating  the  proposition,  the  
Trent court suggested that, “short of committing a trespass,” extraction of miner-
als through hydraulic fracturing is still governed by the rule of capture. 319  The 
court also stated that a theoretical trespass cause of action may exist, but it would 
belong to the landowner, rather than the lessee development company. 320 
Second,  Chesapeake  urged  the  court  to  adopt  the rule  set  out  by  the  Texas  
Supreme Court in Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation v. Garza Energy Trust , which 
held that trespass damages for the drainage of hydrocarbons were precluded by 
the rule of capture. 321  In Garza, the Texas Supreme Court laid out four justifica-
tions for holding that trespass claims were barred by the rule of capture:   
1.  The law already affords the owner full recourse. The landowner can drill a 
well of his own, on his own property, to offset the drainage from beneath 
his property. If there is already a lease, the landowner can sue the lessee for 
violation of the implied covenant in the lease to protect against drainage. In 
addition,  he  may  offer  to pool,  and  if  the  offer  is  rejected, apply  to  the 
Texas Railroad Commission for forced pooling.  
2. Allowing  recovery  for  the value  of  the oil  and  gas  drained  by hydraulic 
fracturing  usurps to  the courts the lawful  and preferable  authority  of the 
Railroad Commission to regulate oil and gas production.  
3. [D]etermining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic fracturing is the 
kind of issue the litigation process is least equipped to handle. One diffi-
culty is that the material facts are hidden below miles of rock, making it dif-
ficult to ascertain what might have happened. Such difficulty in proof is one 
of the justifications for the rule of capture. But there is an even greater diffi-
culty with litigating recovery for drainage resulting from fracking, and it is 
that trial judges and juries cannot take into account social policies, industry 
operations, and the greater good which are all tremendously important in 
deciding whether fracking should or should not be against the law.  
4. No one in the oil and gas industry appears to want or need a change in the 
application of the rule of capture to hydraulic fracturing operations. 322  
The Stone court rejected these justifications. Instead, the court quoted primarily  
from the Garza dissent, which pointed out that the rule of capture was created to 
deal with “the fugitive nature” of hydrocarbons. 323 The Garza dissent stated that,  
318.  Id.  
319.  Id.  
320.  Id. 
321.  Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397, at *4 (N.D.W.  
Va. Apr. 10, 2013), vacated, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D.W. Va. July 30, 2013).  
322.  Id. at *5.  
323.  Id. at *6.  
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with respect to hydrocarbons captured through hydraulic fracturing, “the gas at 
issue did not migrate to Coastal’s well because of naturally occurring pressure  
changes in the reservoir.”324 The dissent believed the court was extending the rule 
of capture beyond natural migration, and the  Stone court agreed.325  
Thus, the Stone court stated that the application of the  Garza rule would allow 
companies to force small landowners to lease their land or to take the landowners’ 
resources without providing compensation, and “this court simply cannot believe 
that our West Virginia Supreme Court would permit such a result.” 326 The Stone 
court held  that  an  unapproved  extraction  of minerals  from  under  a  neighbor’s 
land via hydraulic fracturing “is not protected by the ‘rule of capture’, but rather 
constitutes an actionable trespass.” 327 
Although the  Stone court rejected the notion that the rule of capture applies to 
oil  and  gas  extracted  via hydraulic  fracturing  so  as  to  bar  a  trespass  cause  of  
action,328  this does not mean the Stone court was dispositive on the subsurface  
trespass  issue.  The  Stone opinion  was later  vacated  as  part  of  a settlement  
between the parties that rendered the opinion non-binding.329  Furthermore, the 
order was limited to Chesapeake’s motion for summary judgment, which means 
that it was not dispositive of the legal issues presented. This leaves more ques-
tions than answers as to whether a landowner has a trespass cause of action when 
oil and gas are drained from beneath his or her land without his or her permission 
through hydraulic  fracturing.  Despite  its limitations,  Stone  v.  Chesapeake 
Appalachia remains  the leading  case involving  subsurface  trespass  in  West 
Virginia. But the miniscule sample size of other cases involving subsurface tres- 
pass makes it naı̈ve to believe the issue is settled. 
At least one legal scholar, Owen Anderson, believes that a cause of action for 
subsurface trespass should be narrow in scope and recovery should be permitted 
only upon proof of actual and substantial damages. 330  Anderson further argues 
that injunctive relief should only be granted if the harm to the landowner “clearly 
outweighs  the utility  of  the  subsurface  invasion.” 331  Anderson’s  basis  for  this 
argument is that most subsurface invasions meet important societal needs, which 
must be economically efficient if they are to succeed. 332  Anderson argues that a 
strict application of trespass law to the subsurface, particularly the landowner’s 
right  to  enjoin  a  continuing  trespass, would  often  render  a  business  enterprise  
324.  Id.  
325.  Id.  
326.  Id.  
327.  Id. at *8.  
328.  Id. 
329.  Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D.W. Va. July  
30, 2013).  
330.  Owen  L.  Anderson, Subsurface  “Trespass”:  A  Man’s  Subsurface  Is  Not  His Castle ,  49  
WASHBURN L.J. 247, 282 (2010).  
331.  Id. at 249, 282.  
332.  Id. at 281.  
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economically unviable. 333 Anderson analogizes a landowner’s subsurface rights 
to his or her airspace rights,  which are not absolute and only actionable  if the 
plaintiff can demonstrate actual damages. 334 This relationship was acknowledged  
by both the Texas and Ohio Supreme Courts in Garza and Chance respectively,  
each discussed above.335 
Anderson’s  theory  was fully  embraced  by  the  Texas  Supreme  Court  in 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Maziel, in which the Court held that a trespass 
does not occur when injected secondary recovery salt water moves across lease 
lines.336 In Maziel, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s injection of salt water  
encroached on his subsurface rights, constituting a trespass.337 However, the court 
rejected this argument, explaining that: 
Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh the interests of society and the 
oil and gas industry as a whole against the interests of the individual operator  
who is damaged; and if the authorized activities in an adjoining secondary re-
covery  unit  are  found  to  be  based  on  some substantial,  justifying  occasion, 
then this court should sustain their validity. 338  
The court reasoned that the defendant’s actions were necessary to protect the 
correlative  rights  of  those involved  in  the drilling  unit  and  that  such  rights 
trumped the individual landowner’s interest. 339  
b. Nuisance 
Historically, the nuisance doctrine has provided plaintiffs with a flexible tool 
for challenging a variety of environmental issues when regulation was nonexis- 
tent or inadequate.340 Although the common law concerning hydraulic fracturing 
(“fracking”) is not well-developed, common law actions involving fracking raise   
333.  Id. at 281–82.  
334.  Id. at 254–55 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (recognizing that airplanes 
may freely navigate airspace unless the flights are so low and constant as to make it impossible for the 
true owner to reside upon or farm the land)); Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758– 
59 (9th Cir. 1936) (holding that the use of airspace is not unlawful without proof of actual injury).  
335.  See Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (explaining that just as a 
property owner must accept some limitations on the ownership rights extending above the surface of the 
property, there are also limitations on property owners’ subsurface rights); see also Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008) (explaining that an invasion of airspace is only 
actionable if the invasion has interfered with the landowner’s actual or potential use and occupation of 
the land). 
336.  R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568–69 (Tex. 1962).  
337.  Id. at 566.  
338.  Id. at 568.  
339.  See id. at 572.  
340.  See G. Nelson  Smith,  III, Nuisance  and  Trespass Claims  in Environmental  Litigation: 
Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion , 36 SANTA  CLARA L. REV. 39, 42 (1995); see also  
James  A.  Sevinsky, Public  Nuisance:  A  Common-Law  Remedy  Among  the  Statutes ,  5  NAT.  RES.  &  
ENV’T 29, 30 (1990).  
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private nuisance issues.341 
A “nuisance” is an unreasonable interference with one’s use and enjoyment of 
his or her land. 342 Most states distinguish private nuisances from public nuisan- 
ces.343 A disgruntled dissenting landowner is unlikely to bring a successful public 
nuisance claim because the State of Ohio approves hydraulic fracturing wells by  
issuing permits through the DOGRM.344 Therefore, the more likely common law 
tort claim for the dissenting landowner is a private nuisance claim. 
A private nuisance is a tort against the landowner’s right to use and enjoy his 
or her land. A claim must be grounded on the individual’s interest in the land. 345 
To  recover  damages  under  a  private  nuisance  theory,  a plaintiff  must  show: 
(1a) intentional  and unreasonable  interference  with  private  interest  in land  or 
(1b) unintentional, but actionable interference due to negligence, recklessness, or 
by engaging in abnormally dangerous activity; (2) causation; and (3) substantial  
or significant harm.346  
341.  See Suzuki, supra note 143, at 293–94; cf. O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 
657–58  (E.D.  Pa.  1981). Examples  of typical hydraulic fracturing-related  nuisance  actions allege 
pollution emanating from a gas well, lingering noxious odors, and excessive noise and dust coupled with 
release of “fracking fluids” near one’s property. These examples are not limited to surface activities, but 
most analysts agree that plaintiffs will have less difficulty surviving motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment if their claims focus on surface, rather than sub-surface activities. This is because it 
is easier to meet the evidentiary burden of proving “interference/disruption,” with a “reasonable use of 
the land,” and “harm” when the activity takes place in plain sight. When the alleged nuisance occurs a 
mile  underground,  these elements  are difficult  to  prove,  even  with  expert  testimony  and  scientific  
evidence. 
342. O’Neil v. Atwell, 598 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (internal citation omitted). 
343.  In Ohio, a “public nuisance” is defined as an unreasonable interference with a right common to 
the general public.  See Brown v. Cty. Comm’rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1158–59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (Am. Law Inst. 1979)). A public nuisance affects the public at 
large or such of them as may come in contact with it, by injuriously affecting the safety, health of the 
public, or working some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public.  See Crown Prop. 
Dev., Inc. v. Omega Oil Co., N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). A “private nuisance” is an act 
that wrongfully interferes with another’s interest, use, or enjoyment of land; it can also be anything that 
obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property. Private nuisance covers the invasion of the 
private interest in the use and enjoyment of land. Unlike a public nuisance, a private nuisance threatens 
only one or a few persons. The law of private nuisance is a law of degree which generally turns on the 
factual question of whether the use to which property is put is a reasonable use under the circumstances 
and  whether  there  is  an appreciable, substantial, tangible  injury resulting  in actual, material,  and 
physical discomfort.  See e.g., Brackett v. Moler Raceway Park, LLC, 960 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2011); Davis v. Widman, 922 N.E.2d 272, 282 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009); Rautsaw v. Clark, 488 N.  
E.2d 243, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).  
344.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.05 (LexisNexis 2011) (“No person shall drill a new well, drill 
an existing well any deeper, reopen a well . . . without having a permit to do so issued by the chief of the 
division of oil and gas resources management.”); see also  Hager v. Waste Techs. Indus., 2002-Ohio-  
3466, ¶ 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a public nuisance cannot exist where actor has a permit or 
license form the state to operate). 
345.  Brackett v. Moler Raceway Park, LLC, 960 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (defining a  
private nuisance).  
346.  Id.  
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With  respect  to  private  nuisance claims  arising  from  fracking  activity,  each 
element presents its own distinct issues. With regard to the first element, because 
oil and gas production activities are approved by the State of Ohio via permits, 
courts are hesitant to find that a state-approved practice will constitute an “inter-
ference” if the well is functioning properly. 347 Thus, plaintiffs must present evi-
dence to show that a well is not functioning properly or has otherwise interfered 
with  some  private  interest  in  their land. 348 Second, while  some  courts  have 
implied that the standard of proof for determining causation might be relaxed in  
fracking cases,349 scientific research and data analysis are likely necessary to es-
tablish a causal link between the plaintiff’s alleged interference and the defend- 
ant’s tortious conduct.350 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for potential nuisance claims, courts rec-
ognize the significant harm element to mean more than “slight inconvenience or  
petty annoyance.”351 But because nuisance law recognizes a wide variety of inter-
ests,  the  harm  does  not  have  to  be  as tangible. 352 For example,  trespass law 
requires harm resulting from a physical invasion of one’s property, whereas nui-
sance law simply requires harm to the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of his or her  
property,  which  can  arise  in  numerous  forms.353 This  means  a plaintiff could 
bring a nuisance claim alleging an “assault on their senses” or emotional harm 
including “fear, apprehension, or loss of peace of mind” resulting from the frack- 
ing  operations.354 Because  of  the  myriad  interests  that  nuisance law  protects, 
common law nuisance actions may provide a flexible, albeit difficult, alternative 
for a landowner when his or her ability to use and enjoy his or her property has 
been negatively affected by fracking activities beneath his or her land. 
In Ohio, common law nuisance refers to an unreasonable interference with the  
use  and  enjoyment  of  one’s  property.  It  covers  a  broad  spectrum  of  interests, 
including “personal legal rights and privileges generally.” 355  The Ohio Supreme  
347.  See Davis, 922 N.E.2d at 282 (explaining that an absolute nuisance will  not be found where one 
has been given permission or authority to operate or erect the alleged nuisance, or one has complied with 
applicable  statutes  and regulations,  but  a qualified  nuisance  may  be  found  if  the lawfully  permitted 
facility is “negligently maintained” in a manner that breaches the operator’s duty of care); see also Little  
Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2015) 
(explaining that in Ohio, a facility that “operates under the sanction of law cannot be a common-law 
public nuisance” because “conduct which is fully authorized by statute or administrative regulation is 
not an actionable tort[,]” and holding that defendant’s waste disposal practices at its water treatment 
facility did not constitute a public nuisance).  
348.  Suzuki, supra note 143, at 279–80.  
349.  Id. at 288.  
350.  Id. at 288–89.  
351.  Id. at 279–80.  
352.  Id.  
353.  Id. at 281.  
354.  See id. at 288. 
355.  Banford  v. Aldrich  Chem.  Co.,  932  N.E.2d  313,  317  (Ohio  2010) (internal  citation  and  
quotation marks omitted).  
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Court recognizes private nuisance as anything that by its continuous use or exis-
tence works annoyance, harm, inconvenience, or damage to another landowner in 
the enjoyment of his property; activity which results in unreasonable interference  
with  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  another’s  property.356  A  nuisance  action  must 
involve a real, material, and substantial injury. Damages commonly include dimi-
nution in property value, costs of repairs, loss of use of the property, or compen- 
sation for annoyance, discomfort, and inconvenience.357 
Ohio  courts  divide  private  nuisances  into  two  categories: absolute  nuisance 
(nuisance per se) and qualified nuisance (nuisance dependent on negligence). 358 
Absolute nuisance refers to an act that is either intentional or abnormally danger-
ous due to the particular hazards involved. 359  Ohio courts have not considered 
whether  fracking  constitutes  an abnormally  dangerous  activity.  However,  it  is 
unlikely they would do so because no U.S. court to date has held that it constitutes 
an “abnormally dangerous activity.” 360 
Two  cases  in Pennsylvania,  however,  survived  motions  to  dismiss  after  the 
plaintiffs alleged strict liability based on the “ultra-hazardous” nature of frack- 
ing.361 Both cases involved allegations of groundwater contamination due to the  
presence of fracking fluids. In both, the court denied the defendant gas production  
company’s motions to dismiss on the grounds that “the determination of whether 
or not an activity is abnormally dangerous is fact-intensive,” and therefore, it is 
more appropriate to wait until after discovery before making the determination. 362 
This shows that some courts are not willing to state affirmatively that fracking is 
not “abnormally dangerous.” 
In contrast, a qualified nuisance is premised on negligence. 363 A qualified nui-
sance  is  a lawful  act  performed  so carelessly  or negligently  that  it  creates  an 
unreasonable risk of harm, resulting in injury to another. 364 A qualified nuisance 
claim may involve the negligent maintenance of a condition that creates a risk of 
harm which leads to injury. 365  
In Amore v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, the court held that a highway addi-
tion, which brought travel lanes sixty-five feet closer to Amore’s home, consti-
tuted  an absolute  nuisance,  rather  than  a qualified  nuisance,  because  the  
356.  See Taylor  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  55  N.E.2d  724,  730–31  (Ohio  1944); see also  Kramer  v. 
Angel’s Path, L.L.C., 882 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  
357.  Banford, 932 N.E.2d at 317.  
358.  Kramer, 882 N.E.2d at 52.  
359.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
360.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff, 122 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Okla. 1942) (demonstrating 
that oil and gas wells are not “nuisances per se”); see also  McGregor v. Camden, 34 S.E. 936, 937 (W.  
Va. 1899) (same).  
361.  See Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 476, 485 (M.D. Pa. 2013); see also  Berish  
v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2010).  
362.  Id.  
363.  Id. at 53 (internal citation omitted).  
364.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
365.  Id. at 732–33 (internal citations omitted).  
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construction performed was intentional, rather than negligent or deficient in some  
manner.366 The placement of the new lanes resulted in increased traffic noise and 
increased visibility  of  the  highway. 367 In  this  context, “intentional”  does  not 
mean that the commission intentionally produced the nuisance (excessive noise), 
simply that they intentionally initiated the act that gave rise to the nuisance— 
building the highway. 
This distinction is important because of the uncertainty regarding the applic-
ability of nuisance actions to hydraulic fracturing. For example, if an oil or gas 
production company constructs a well pad directly in front of a plaintiff’s home, 
the  construction  and  operation  of  which results  in substantial  noise  and  an 
obstructed view of his or her lake, the plaintiff would need to allege an “absolute 
nuisance.” In contrast, if an oil or gas production company constructs  a faulty 
well pad that leaks fluid and contaminates plaintiff’s groundwater, the plaintiff 
would need to bring a claim alleging a “qualified nuisance.” Although the case 
law is sparse, the rapid pace of shale development in Ohio may lead to an increase 
in the number of nuisance claims. 
Dissenting landowners will  have difficulty  succeeding  in  a  nuisance  action 
against an oil and gas company when their claim concerns the location and opera-
tion of the well. For instance, in Natale v. Everflow Eastern, Inc., the Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals in Ohio held that the plaintiff, Natale, could not rely on 
the alleged violation of a local ordinance to support his claim for qualified nui- 
sance.368 In this case, the plaintiff landowner brought suit against an oil and gas 
producer who had built an injection well and gas storage tanks on his next-door  
neighbor’s property.369 Natale claimed that the offensive smell, sight, and noise 
emanating from the well and tanks deprived him of the enjoyment and use of his  
property.370 Further, Natale alleged that Everflow was liable for a qualified nui-
sance based on negligence per se because Everflow violated a Warren City ordi-
nance, which provided that “no person shall operate any oil or gas well in the city 
in such a manner as to be injurious, noxious, offensive, or dangerous to the health, 
safety, welfare, or property of others.” 371  However, the court rejected this argu-
ment, explaining that not every violation of a provision of law constitutes negli- 
gence per se.372 Instead, Everflow’s liability would be determined by applying 
the  test  of  due  care  as  exercised  by  a reasonably  prudent  person  under  the  
circumstances.373  
366.  See Amore v. Ohio Turnpike Comm’n, 955 N.E.2d 410, 415–16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (internal  
citation omitted).  
367.  Cf. id.  
368.  See Natale v. Everflow E., Inc., 959 N.E.2d 602, 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).  
369.  Id. at 605.  
370.  Id.  
371.  Id. at 609.  
372.  Id.  
373.  Id.  
686  THE  GEORGETOWN  ENVTL. LAW  REVIEW [Vol. 30:633 
Further, the court did not believe that Natale presented evidence demonstrating 
that he was unreasonably deprived of the use and enjoyment of his land, aside 
from occasional sleep disturbance and an odor of oil which is “no different from 
any oil-well operation.” 374 Without evidence of a defect, Everflow’s routine oper-
ation of the well did not create an unreasonable risk of harm nor did it produce a  
significant injury.375 Thus, Natale could not maintain a qualified nuisance claim 
based on negligence. 376  
The Natale case suggests that Ohio landowners, dissenting or otherwise, will 
have difficulty succeeding in a nuisance action against an oil and gas company 
when their claim concerns the location and operation of the well. Because the 
Ohio  DOGRM  has exclusive regulatory  authority  over the wells’ location  and 
operation, landowners cannot rely on local ordinances or on common law nui-
sance claims  based  on  those  ordinances  to  protect  them. 377  The Natale  court 
did suggest that a qualified nuisance action might be available with proof that a 
well  does  not  meet  the normal limits  required  by  the  Ohio  Revised  Code, 
Ohio  Administrative  Code,  and regulations  prescribed  by  the  Ohio  DNR. 378 
However,  this level  of  evidentiary  proof  is difficult  for  a landowner  to  
obtain.379 Expert  testimony  is  expensive, especially  when  viewed  through  the 
lens of a typical nuisance claim in which no surface property has been disturbed. 
If Ohio courts continue to follow Natale, a typical nuisance claim involving a 
foul smell or annoying sound likely will not survive summary judgment without 
some evidence that the well is not operating within the limits of Ohio’s regulatory  
system. 
Although  nuisance  has  not usually  been  a successful  avenue  for  redress  by 
dissenting landowners,  it  may  be useful  in  some limited  circumstances.  For 
example, in  Butts v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., the plaintiff alleged 
private nuisance due to “excessive noise and light” and “water contamination” 
due to defendant’s oil and gas production operations. 380 The plaintiffs’ complaint 
alleged that they had been unable to enjoy their home since 2009 (when drilling 
commenced) due to the defendant’s drilling of a hydraulically fractured well. 381 
A federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because 
the  significance  of  the  invasion  caused  by  “excessive  noise  and light”  was  an   
374.  Id. at 610.  
375.  See id. at 612.  
376.  See id.  
377.  Heidi  Gorovitz  Robertson, When  States’ Legislation  and  Constitutions Collide  with  Angry 
Locals: Shale Oil and Gas Development and Its Many Masters , 41 WM. & MARY  ENVTL. L. & POL’Y  
REV. 55, 63, 76 (2016).  
378.  Id. at 76.  
379. Natale, 959 N.E.2d at 610.  
380.  Butts v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 3:12·CV·1330, 2014 WL 3953155, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Aug.  
12, 2014).  
381.  Cf. id. at *4.  
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issue for the jury to decide.382 Here, the plaintiff’s lay testimony was sufficient to  
survive  the  defendant’s  attempt  to  have  the  case  dismissed  through  summary 
judgment, despite the absence of an objective standard, such as decibel levels or 
acoustic analysis. 383 Landowners may at least take comfort in the knowledge that 
their own testimony regarding the extent of harm to their ability to use their prop-
erty may be sufficient for a court to allow their complaint to stand.  
In Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation ,384 a case brought in federal court in 
Pennsylvania, the plaintiff, Roth, alleged private nuisance when the defendant, 
Cabot Oil & Gas, allowed gas wells to “exist and operate in a dangerous and haz-
ardous  condition,”  causing  discharge  of chemicals  into  groundwater supply. 385 
The  court concluded  that the plaintiff’s complaint  contained  sufficient facts  to 
survive a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff produced evidence to demon-
strate that the defendant’s alleged actions were either intentional and unreason-
able  or unintentional  and negligent. 386 Here,  the plaintiff’s  evidence  of  the 
alleged negligent  conduct, including  changes  in water quality  before  and  after 
drilling  and  a  description  of  defective  casings, 387  was  sufficient  to  survive  a 
motion for dismissal.  
In Hiser v. XTO Energy Inc., the plaintiff, Hiser, filed suit against the defend-
ant, XTO Energy, seeking damages for harm to her home allegedly caused by 
seismic vibrations from the defendant’s nearby drilling operations. 388  The court  
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Hiser had pro-
vided sufficient circumstantial evidence in the form of lay testimony (from a gen-
eral engineer) to meet the pleading burden on a nuisance claim. 389 
The trespass and nuisance landscape for hydraulic fracturing remains largely 
undeveloped.390 Based on prior nuisance cases, only landowners who can prove 
that an operator sent large quantities of pollution to the surface and that this pollu-
tion harmed their property, have a strong chance of success in a nuisance claim. 391 
But even to the extent that there are glimmers of possibility within the area of 
nuisance,  the  cases  thus  far  have dealt only  with potential  nuisance  affecting 
the  surface,  not  the  subsurface  of  a landowner’s land.  Landowners overlying 
hydraulically fractured wells, as well as neighboring mineral and surface owners 
alleging  nuisance  or  trespass  from  subsurface pollution  or  fractures,  may  face   
382.  Id.  
383.  Id. at *3–4. 
384.  Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 476, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2013).  
385.  Id.  
386.  Id.  
387.  Id. at 483.  
388.  Hiser v. XTO Energy Inc., 2012 WL 3542009, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2012).  
389.  Id.  
390.  Cf.  Hannah  Wiseman, Beyond Coastal Oil  v.  Garza:  Nuisance  and  Trespass  in Hydraulic  
Fracturing Litigation, 57 THE ADVOCATE 8, 11 (2011).  
391.  Id.  
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greater difficulty in establishing a claim for nuisance. 392 A dissenting landowner, 
for whom the well-head is not on the surface of his or her land and the well-bore 
is located a mile or so beneath his or her land, may have even more difficulty 
showing that a hydraulically fractured well, far beneath the surface, has substan-
tially interfered with his or her use and enjoyment of the land. 
3. Constitutional Challenges to a Mandatory Pooling or Forced Unitization  
Order 
When presented with the idea that the government could include a landowner’s 
land in a drilling unit against that landowner’s wishes, the most obvious constitu-
tional challenge may be the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. People 
likely assume a taking has occurred by exercise of eminent domain or by a regula-
tory taking for which a public purpose must be identified and just compensation 
paid. This section addresses briefly some of the obvious constitutional challenges 
a landowner might consider following the mandatory pooling or forced unitiza-
tion of his or her land. 
Property professors are well-known for characterizing property ownership as a 
collection of rights depicted by a “bundle of sticks.” This illustration is rooted in 
the idea that property ownership includes a collection of rights associated with 
the property: the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to control its dis-
position. Each constitutes a separate stick in the collective bundle. A “taking” is 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment if property is taken for public use. 393 
But, what amount and which “sticks” must be taken to constitute a compensable 
taking, particularly in the world of oil and gas production? 
If a mandatory pooling or unitization order caused the taking of just one com-
plete stick—such as the right to exclude non-owners from one’s land or the right 
to control  the  use  of  one’s land—might  that  count  as  a  taking  of  property  for 
which just compensation would be due? Under the circumstances of a dissenting 
landowner, the landowner can still use his or her land for most purposes because 
the oil and gas production takes place so far beneath the landowner’s land that it 
is usually completely undetectable  on  the  surface. 394 Assuming  the landowner 
can still use the surface for anything he or she chooses, what has been taken? 
Perhaps the right to control the disposition of one’s property—a standard stick 
in the property rights bundle—has been taken. Although a landowner can decide, 
within reason and within legal limits, how the property will be used, compulsory 
pooling or unitization arguably takes away at least part of this right. However, the 
landowner might still be able to decide to use the surface of the land for a house, 
a campsite, or a bird sanctuary. But, in the event of a mandatory pooling or com-
pulsory unitization order, the dissenting landowner can no longer decide to bar  
392.  Id.  
393.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
394.  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
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drilling from occurring beneath it. This view that property rights in the bundle 
may be severed and an individual stick may be taken has been called “conceptual  
severance.”395 It allows the splitting, or severing, of property rights into smaller 
pieces which may be taken under the Fifth Amendment. For example, if a person 
retains ownership and use of the property but can no longer use it in a specific,  
desired way, is the taking of the right to use the property as the person chooses  
sufficient to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment? 
The landowner’s  right  to exclude  is also a right  in  the proverbial bundle  of 
sticks. Mandatory pooling and forced unitization of the dissenting landowner’s 
land  does  not  take  away  the  right  to exclude  non-owners  from  the  surface. 
However, it does prevent the landowner from barring a non-owner from drilling 
under the land, far beneath the surface. Has the whole right to exclude been taken 
by virtue of pooling or unitization? Maybe not. But if you believe the landowner 
has  rights  that  extend  far  beneath  the  surface,  then  the  right  to exclude  non-  
owners deep underground has been taken. 
Applying the idea of conceptual severance, the taking of any individual “stick” 
would constitute a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. The govern-
ment would be required to compensate individuals whose property rights were 
adversely affected by governmental regulations. Suffice to say, courts have not 
fully embraced the conceptual severance theory of property, and many feel that 
courts have done little to clarify a position regarding conceptual severance and 
takings law. 396 
a. Evolution of U.S. Supreme Court Takings Cases Related to Drilling 
Before the seminal Pennsylvania Coal case, courts generally construed a “tak-
ing” as the outright physical occupation of the whole (land) unit of property by  
the government.397 However, in Pennsylvania Coal , the U.S. Supreme Court rec-
ognized that when a governmental action interferes with a property owner’s use 
and this interference results in economic harm to the owner, this interference con-
stituted a taking of property if the regulation “goes too far.” 398 While the meaning  
of “too far” has been subject to vigorous debate, the Pennsylvania Coal  decision 
recognized that a governmental action can constitute a taking when it interferes 
with  enough  of  the whole  property  to  become objectionable.  The  question  of  
“how far” is a matter of degree.399  
395.  Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence  
of  Takings,  88  COLUMBIA  L.  REV.  1667,  1676  (1988)  (describing  the  emergence  of conceptual  
severance).  
396.  Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit , 85 CORNELL  
L. REV. 586, 595–96 (2000).  
397.  Id. at 596. 
398.  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
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How does this relate to the bundle of sticks? The Court recognized that when 
one, or several, of the “sticks” are interfered with, this could constitute a taking in  
certain circumstances.400  Thus, the Court took one step toward embracing con-
ceptual  severance  and  abandoning  the traditional physical  occupation standard 
when property rights are viewed in context of the Takings Clause. 
Subsequent courts took differing approaches in applying Pennsylvania Coal .  
For instance, in 1978, the Penn Central Court found that a city law prohibiting a 
company from adding an office building on top of an historical landmark did not  
constitute a taking.401 The Court based its decision on a multi-factor, ad hoc test.  
In 1987, the Keystone Court found that a state law prohibiting a coal company 
from mining its support estate—the rights it had to the subsurface minerals—did 
not constitute a taking because of the relatively small economic value of the sup-
port estate compared to the whole estate. 402 In 1992, the Lucas Court found that a 
state law prohibiting a landowner from developing his coastal property did con-
stitute a taking because the regulation “denied all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of land.” 403  However, the Lucas ruling did not shed much light on 
conceptual severance because the issue involved an extreme case of devaluation 
of the entire estate, rather than a distinct portion of it. However, Justice Scalia’s 
dicta in the case implied that the Court might apply conceptual severance in the  
future.404 
b. Recent Supreme Court Treatment of Conceptual Severance 
Overall,  with  regard  to  the  current  state  of  takings law,  the  Supreme  Court 
regards total destruction of economic or productive use of property as a taking  
which requires compensation.405 However, when the situation is ambiguous (par-
tial destruction of a single “stick”), courts seem to apply the ad-hoc Penn Central 
balancing test, evaluating: the economic impact of the regulation on the owner; 
the  extent  to  which regulation  interfered  with reasonable  investment-backed 
expectations; and the character of the government action involved. 406 
In 2002, the Court addressed a conceptual severance argument in  Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency .407  Here, a state 
regulation  imposed a thirty-two-month moratorium on development within the 
Lake  Tahoe  basin.  A  group  of real  estate  owners alleged  that, like  in  Lucas, 
the regulatory  actions  constituted  a  per  se  taking  of  their  property  without  
400.  Cf. id.  
401.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
402.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). 
403.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).  
404.  Id.  
405.  Id. at 1030–31.  
406.  See  Courtney  C.  Tedrowe, Conceptual  Severance  and  Takings  in  the Federal  Circuit ,  85  
CORNELL L. REV. 586, 598 (2000); see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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compensation during the thirty-two-month period. The Court rejected the concep-
tual severance argument “because it ignores Penn Central ’s admonition that in 
regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’” It reasoned  
that when any property right (“stick”) is taken, it is taken in its entirety; thus, the 
relevant  question  is  whether  the  property  is partially  or entirely  taken. Unless 
there was a taking of the whole property, the Penn Central framework applies. 
This  case-specific factual analysis  is  not  the  determinative rule-like  scheme 
Professor  Radin’s conceptual  severance  theory  promotes.  How  the  Supreme 
Court will treat the conceptual severance theory in circumstances like those of 
the dissenting landowner is unclear at best; the Court prefers to focus on the regu-
lation’s effect on the cumulative bundle of sticks, rather than on each individual  
stick or property right. 
c. Judicial Unwillingness to Find a Taking 
Courts have not struck down mandatory pooling and forced unitization statutes 
as unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. Rather, courts across the country 
have repeatedly upheld mandatory pooling  and forced  unitization  statutes  as  a 
valid exercise of the state’s police power. 
For example,  in Anderson  v.  Corporation  Commission  of Oklahoma ,  the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the state’s pooling and unitization statutes 
against  a constitutional challenge. 408  In  Anderson,  the plaintiff’s  property  was 
forced into a single drilling unit by the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 
the governmental body responsible for issuing pooling and unitization orders. As 
with many pooling and unitization statutes, the law dictated the plaintiff’s com-
pensation if he chose to “participate” in the drilling unit. The plaintiff challenged 
the validity of the statute, alleging that it amounted to an unconstitutional taking 
of his property. The court rejected this argument, holding that the order “was a 
proper  exercise  of  the police  power  in  furtherance  of  conservation  of natural  
resources,” and that “the order herein and the statute authorizing it were not inva-
sions  of  the  rights  of  [the plaintiff],  as  guaranteed  by  the  State  and Federal  
Constitutions.”409 In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that “’[a] state 
has constitutional power to regulate production of oil and gas so as to prevent 
waste and to secure equitable apportionment among landholders of the migratory 
gas and oil underlying their land, fairly distributing among them the costs of pro- 
duction and of the apportionment.’”410 
Similarly, in Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held 
that Mississippi’s compulsory pooling statute was within the police power of the 
state to prevent waste, to conserve natural resources, and to protect correlative  
408.  Anderson v. Corp. Comm’n, 327 P.2d 699, 702 (Okla. 1957).  
409.  Id. at 703.  
410.  Id. (quoting Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 227 (1943)).  
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rights of the owners in a common source of supply. 411  This case arose out of an 
order  by  the  Mississippi Oil  and  Gas  Board  that pooled  four individual land-
owners’  properties  into  a single drilling  unit established  by  the  Superior Oil 
Company. The landowners opposed the order, challenging the constitutional ba-
sis  of  the  statute  authorizing  the  Board’s pooling  order.  However,  the  court 
rejected the landowners’ challenge, holding that the law was a proper exercise of 
the state’s police power, explaining that “[t]he police power of the state includes 
not only regulations to promote public health, good morals, and good order, but 
also the right to regulate and to promote development of industry and utilization 
of natural resources in order to add to the wealth and prosperity of the state.” 412 
The court further explained that “courts have consistently held that the state may 
enact regulatory laws for and prescribe methods of extracting oil and gas for the 
purposes of conservation, the efficient utilization of reservoir energy, and the pro-
tection of the correlative rights of all owners in a common source of supply.” 413 
Based upon this reasoning, the court concluded “the Board power to require pool-
ing, is within the police power of the state and is constitutionally valid.” 414  
CONCLUSION 
Most people would not expect that a landowner does not have control to decide 
whether oil and gas production will take place beneath his or her land. This article 
explains some of the reasons for the surprising truth that a landowner’s refusal to 
allow his or her land to be included in a drilling unit can be overruled by order of  
a state agency. 
The state agency can force a landowner’s land into a drilling unit. By forcing 
the land’s inclusion  in  a drilling  unit,  the  state  agency  prevents  the  dissenting 
landowner from effectively vetoing his or her neighbors’ efforts to develop oil 
and  gas  resources  when  the  neighbors  cannot assemble  an appropriately  sized 
and shaped drilling parcel without the dissenter’s land. This is a state-sanctioned 
preference  for  the  neighbors’ correlative  rights  (to develop  the  underground 
resource) over the dissenting landowner’s property right (to control how his or 
her land is used). 
This article explored  the  dissenting landowner’s  opportunities  to  reduce  the 
likelihood that his or her land will be forced into a drilling unit or pool by state 
order. For example, provided the land is owned as a unified estate, the dissenting 
landowner  may  create  a  conservation  easement  and  vest control  of  his  or  her 
lands to an organization that would not allow a subsequent owner of the land to 
join  a drilling  unit voluntarily. Although  this  may help  prevent voluntary 
411.  Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 59 So. 2d 85, 93 (Miss. 1952), error overruled , 59 So. 2d 844 (Miss.  
1952).  
412.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
413.  Id.  
414.  Id. at 97.  
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inclusion of the land in a drilling unit, it is unlikely to protect a dissenting land-
owner against state ordered inclusion because a conservation easement could be  
terminated by a state eminent domain action. 
The landowner may also challenge the land’s inclusion in a drilling unit by par- 
ticipating in the administrative process during the period when the state agency is 
working to add land to a drilling unit or pool against the landowner’s wishes. The 
procedural rules make it difficult for a landowner to succeed largely due to an 
imbalance in access to information and to an administrative process that favors 
developers. The dissenting landowner could challenge the necessity of the order, 
alleging that the size and shape of the parcel is already sufficient without the dis-
senter’s land, or that the developer failed to attempt to reach a voluntary agree-
ment  on  a  just  and equitable  basis.  The landowner  can  force  the developer  to 
address legitimate safety concerns. He or she can also force the state agency to 
follow  its  own rules  regarding notice to the landowner of  state  action  that  are 
potentially adverse to the landowner’s interests. 
In terms of post-inclusion opportunities for redress, the dissenting landowner 
may attempt to bring common law claims for trespass or nuisance, though both 
are unlikely to succeed. Trespass is difficult to prove if it occurs close to a mile 
beneath  the  surface,  and  even  if  proved,  damages would  be minimal  without 
actual harm to the surface. Nuisance would be similarly difficult. The imposition 
on the landowner’s use and enjoyment of the property would arguably be small 
when it occurs deep beneath the surface. The imposition would also be mainly an 
interference with more ephemeral rights—like the right to decide how the prop-
erty is use—than with its actual use and enjoyment. Even if these tools provide 
some limited remedy or redress, they do not assist the dissenting landowner in 
preventing the involuntary adding of the land to a drilling unit by the state. 
Finally, the dissenter will not find relief in the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
takings provision. Although it may seem like a taking of, at least, the landowner’s 
right to decide how the land is used, courts often hold otherwise. To date, courts 
have held that the state’s ordered inclusion of a dissenter’s land in a drilling unit 
or pool does not constitute a taking; instead, it is an exercise of the state’s police 
power  and  a legitimate  protection  of correlative  rights  and  conservation  of  
resources. 
The  statutes  and regulations  on pooling  and  unitization  set  up  systems  and 
processes that create incentives for landowners to join pools or units voluntarily. 
The laws include financial disincentives for their refusal. These incentives (or dis-
incentives) confuse the data on voluntary inclusion because they push landowners 
towards voluntarily joining the drilling unit and create an illusion that a given 
project has more support than is real. 
What can dissenters do? They can use the processes provided to them—chal-
lenging pooling or unitization orders on necessity, safety, and process. They can 
also  attempt  to  prevent pooling  by  investigating  conservation  easements,  and 
they can push the common law and constitutional law envelopes to seek redress  
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after the fact on the grounds that important core property rights have been vio-
lated. Perhaps most importantly, they can push legislators and agency-based reg-
ulators to improve the processes for and grounds on which to challenge pooling  
and unitization orders. 
Finally, people are generally unaware that a government agency can order land 
to be included  in a drilling project  against the landowner’s wishes. Dissenting 
landowners can and should change that. They can speak out, making their cir-
cumstances more widely known and understood. They might even find support 
for  increasing  their involvement  in  decision-making  processes  that  effect  their  
property rights.   
